On Intolerance and Immigration: Understanding Perceptions

of Intra- and Extradiversity in Denmark and Canada by Bodington, Malene R.
ON INTOLERANCE AND IMMIGRATION: UNDERSTANDING PERCEPTIONS OF







Presented in Partial Fulfilment of the Requirements




© Malene Bodington, 2010
CONCORDIA UNIVERSITY
School of Graduate Studies
This is to certify that the thesis prepared
By: Malene Bodington
Entitled: On Intolerance and Immigration: Understanding Perceptions
of Intra- and Extradiversity in Denmark and Canada
and submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of
Master of Arts (Sociology)
complies with the regulations of the University and meets the accepted standards
with respect to originality and quality.
Signed by the final examining committee:
 Bart Simon                                          Chair
 Bill Reimer                                          Examiner
 Sylvia Kairouz                                    Examiner
 Jean-Philippe Warren                       Supervisor
Approved by:  Fran Shaver                                        _____            
         Chair of Department or Graduate Program Director
 Brian Lewis_______________________________
Dean of Faculty of Arts and Science
iii
ABSTRACT
ON INTOLERANCE AND IMMIGRATION: UNDERSTANDING PERCEPTIONS OF
INTRA- AND EXTRA-DIVERSITY IN DENMARK AND CANADA
MALENE BODINGTON
The increasing pace of immigration to the Western world and the subsequent
xenophobic backlashes to immigrants has created an urgent need for empirical research
that examines the dynamics of immigration and xenophobia. This project addresses that
dynamic through a comparative analysis of Denmark and Canada, whose histories since
World War II have shaped both official responses and dominant discourses in ways that
position the two countries at near opposite ends of the spectrum of immigration responses
in the Western world.
Moving away from linear, macro-level models employed in most immigration
research, this project employs methods triangulation. It uses both qualitative and
quantitative data to explore the hypothesis that the perceived level of diversity – of the
'self' and the 'other' – is instrumental in shaping the dynamics within which discourses
and attitudes about immigration are negotiated.
The research findings support the diversity hypothesis while also causing us to
expand on it: not only is the receiving population's negotiation of the national identity vis
a vis diversity central in shaping responses to immigration, but the nature of the
distinction between the 'self' and the 'other' is instrumental in this negotiation process.
Furthermore, the level of society from which the identity negotiation process stems -
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whether group-based or focused on the individual - plays a large role in shaping the
responses to immigration.
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1INTRODUCTION
As immigration to the Western world steadily increases the foreign-born
proportion of those countries’ populations, the impact of this trend on the receiving
countries has been labeled a ‘global migration crisis’ (Weiner, 1996). A central issue in
this complex situation is that of intolerance – xenophobic backlashes to immigration –
since “native populations have often looked upon new arrivals with a mixture of
apprehension, suspicion, and disdain” (Betz, 1994: 70). Consequently, there is an
increasingly urgent need for further empirical research that examines the dynamics of
immigration and the roots of xenophobia (Koopmans and Statham, 2003: 2).
The question that began this project was, in its simplest form, what are the
differences between Denmark and Canada that can explain the different immigration
experiences in the two countries? Based on observations, this initial question reflected
perplexity about the dynamics that shaped immigration experiences in both countries.
However, through the review of research and theories in various fields spanning
immigration research, nationalism, and xenophobia, it became apparent that an
underlying element of diversity within the context of identity was largely unaddressed or,
at best, marginally addressed in the literature.
Within the comparative context, the approach of mapping and describing
differences between Denmark and Canada would most likely only contribute marginally
to the knowledge already available. Rather, this research project attempts to answer the
question, what are the dynamics within which discourses and attitudes about immigration
2are shaped? The comparative context is invaluable in answering this question, since it
underscores what sets the two countries apart and in what ways their responses overlap.
Denmark and Canada present two very interesting cases in the study of responses
to immigration. The two countries’ histories since World War II have shaped both official
responses to immigration and dominant discourses on inclusiveness so that the two
countries now appear near opposite ends of the political spectrum. Immigration levels in
Denmark are lower while conversely, a much larger proportion of the Canadian
population is not born in the country (18.2%, compared to 6/0% in Denmark, in 2001).
The Canadian discourse about multiculturalism stands in sharp contrast to a view of
immigration in Denmark that paints it as an issue of “us versus them” – receiving
population and immigrants in a struggle over what values and norms should be dominant
in society.
At its core, the difference has to do not only with the receiving population’s
identity but also with the perceived characteristics of the incoming populations; the way
in which the two countries’ receiving populations perceive of the national identity in
relation to the immigrant population shapes the dominant discourses just as the dominant
discourses shape these perceptions. In order to better comprehend these dynamics, this
project proposes a new understanding of diversity that encompasses two separate aspects:
intradiversity and extradiversity. Intradiversity is the receiving population’s perception of
its own diversity; it is a function of the national identity and describes the degree to
which the population is open to change. Extradiversity describes the diversity of the
‘other’ as perceived by the receiving population; this element is an expression of the
dominant discourses about immigrants and/or particular subgroups in society. The way
3these two expressions of diversity are perceived is instrumental in shaping responses to
immigration. Perceptions of low intradiversity coupled with perceptions of low
extradiversity will lead to more negative responses, since these perceptions are
expressions of strongly defined dynamics of ingroup and outgroup. The opposite is true if
the perception is of high intra- and extradiversity. As the perceived diversity of the ‘self’
and the ‘other’ increases, the differences between the two become less apparent to the
receiving population. As such, communities with such perceptions will exhibit less
resistance to the newcomers. Within this context, it is hypothesised that the Canadian
situation reflects the latter example, while the Danish is more like the former.
While past research on immigration and intolerance has not explicitly explored
the dynamics of identity and diversity, the diversity hypothesis has a solid foundation in
this past research. Most importantly, recent studies have addressed the question of
ethnicity within the context of social trust. The different theoretical approaches that
informed this project’s hypothesis will be outlined and discussed in chapter one.
In order to shed light on the dynamics in the two countries that shape these
perceptions of diversity and, by extensions, the discourses and attitudes about
immigration, this project adopts a methods triangulation approach. By drawing on two
sources of data – one qualitative and one quantitative – the intention is to abandon the
macro-approach generally employed in immigration studies and gain a more nuanced and
comprehensive understanding of the phenomenon. The quantitative analysis draws on the
International Social Survey Programme’s survey on national identity, carried out in
Denmark and Canada in 2003. While this survey permits a macro-level analysis,
representative of the two countries’ populations, the qualitative analysis is designed to
4answer questions that cannot be addressed by the quantitative data, to shed light on
dynamics that are missed by the macro-level approach, and to corroborate findings.
Based on a series of semi-structured interviews with key informants who work in fields
related to immigration, the qualitative analysis sheds light on dynamics in the two
countries that have been uncovered in the research process.
In the quantitative analysis, the diversity hypothesis is operationalised in terms of
two concepts that capture the two elements of the hypothesis: intradiversity is measured
through indicators relating to national identity, while extradiversity is evaluated in terms
of attitudes about immigrants. This operationalisation is primarily a function of the
difficulty of operationalising perceptions, while the availability of data also limits to
ability to create more complex measures of intra- and extradiversity. The qualitative
analysis thus also serves to test and verify this operationalisation.
The methodological approaches are discussed in chapter three, after which
chapters four and five outline the results of the analyses. Finally, a discussion serves to
draw the many aspects of the project together to form conclusions about the hypothesis
within the context of the data from the two countries.
5CHAPTER ONE
DEFINING DIVERSITY: LITERATURE REVIEW
The attempt to explain negative responses to immigration in Western countries
has been approached from a variety of angles. However, since many of the theoretical
directions within migration research have developed as individual fields of research, the
richness of the research is somewhat lost in a tendency towards monocausality; a chosen
approach to the topic is rarely coupled with any other perspectives. As such, there are
comprehensive tomes of theory focusing on such issues as economic conditions (Joppke,
1998; Marr and Siklos, 1994; Müller, 2003), the relationship among immigration,
nationalism, and collective identity (Kupchan, 1995; Hutchinson and Smith, 1994;
Vincent, 2002), immigration and issues of integration and policy (Kymlicka, 2001;
Lamphere, 1992), and more recently, ethnicity and the notion of trust (Banting, Johnston
and Soroka, 2004; Putnam, 2007; Marschall and Stolle, 2004).
A reading of a variety of these different schools of thought does render a richer
picture of the dynamics that shape attitudes towards immigrants; however, the greatest
value of a cross-sectional reading of the research in the field is that it makes it possible to
draw connections and put forth hypotheses that would be obscured within a monocausal
approach. By looking beyond the cause-and-effect approach, it is possible to shed light
on the dynamics within which such relationships exist. This section will briefly explore a
few of these approaches before delving into a discussion of the connections that can be
drawn on the basis of the reading of this varied literature.
61.1 NATIONALISM
A central concept in the study of responses to immigration is nationalism.
Kupchan identifies it as a “common political identity ... an ideology that calls for the
merging of the sentimental nation with the ideological state.” This is ultimately rooted in
a shared ethnicity, lineage, language, culture, religion or citizenship (Kupchan, 1995:2).
This understanding of nationalism is largely accepted amongst theories on the subject,
with the difference being how much emphasis is put on the aspect of ethnicity and culture
versus the state perspective. Although some argue that this distinction is too broad and
Manichean, Aronovitch suggests that the traditional distinction between the civic and
ethnic elements of nationalism is still useful. He argues that it is important to
acknowledge the difference between ethnic nationalism, which is based on
“characteristics like race or ethnic group ... not subject to choice and liable to always be
exclusive and oppressive of others,” and civic nationalism, which finds its bases in “legal
principles and equal rights, which constitute bonds of common citizenship and which can
be open to all whatever their race, religion, ethnic heritage, and so forth” (Aronovitch,
2000:471; see also Weiner, 1996).
Whereas this definition divides nationalism according to implications of identity
formation, Schlesinger makes the distinction along geographic lines, dividing it into
Eastern and Western nationalism. By Western nationalism, he refers to “historic territory,
legal-political community, legal-political equality of members and common civic culture
and ideology”. Eastern nationalism, on the contrary, is “genealogy and presumed descent
ties, popular mobilization, vernacular languages, customs and traditions; an alternative,
ethnic conception of the nation” (Schlesinger, 1994:319). In other words, the Western
7nationalism is largely based on the political history of the nation, while the latter is a
more cultural community. As such, the two definitions of nationalism differ only slightly.
The main difference lies in Schlesinger’s decision to tie each type in with a geographic
region. This distinction is problematic because nationalism in Western European
countries is increasingly prone to taking the form of Schlesinger’s Eastern, or ethnic
nationalism, as in the case of Denmark.
However, Schlesinger’s theory outlines three elements of the identity building
process that help give rise to nationalism: a process of inclusion and exclusion that serves
to determine the boundaries of the group one belongs to; a process of reviving those
historical, shared memories and traditions that help create a collective past (and a
concurrent ‘amnesia’ concerning those memories which do not serve this purpose); and
the reference to a spatial (although not necessarily geographic) collectivity, such as the
‘East Bloc’ during the cold war (Schlesinger, 1994:321).
1.2 PREJUDICE
The reason that nationalism does not neatly arrange itself along geographic lines,
as has traditionally been assumed, may be found in how people’s understanding of the
foreign, the ‘other,’ has changed. Taguieff’s discussion of racism and prejudice helps
shed light on this development. In The Force of Prejudice, Taguieff argues that a shift
occurring in the early eighties has changed racism in a major way, so that it is no longer
merely a matter of ‘race’ (Taguieff, 2001). The shift, Taguieff argues, arose from the
recognition that there is no scientific validity for “racism, as an ideological parasitism of
the bioanthropological sciences (the ‘hard’ sciences),” so that “antiracism placed itself
8before racism as the authority of science in the face of perverse and archaic deliria”
(Taguieff, 2001:2). The antiracist optimism was born out of the belief that racism is but a
theory of ‘races’. However, as “recent offensives of national populism” have shown, this
assumption about racism and racists has been shaken. As traditional “zoobiological”
discourses of racial difference have given way to a discoursive racialisation of ethnicity
and culture – “the new racism of difference” (Taguieff, 2001:7) – cultural relativism is
often heralded by racist ideologies as evidence that cultures should not mix (Taguieff,
2001:5). Simultaneously, the focus of the racist discourses has shifted from inequality to
difference, so that the preservation and survival of cultures and communities is at the
forefront. Since culture and ethnicity are driving forces behind racist discourses, the fear
of métissage – mixing of cultures and ethnicities – becomes justified in discourses of
cultural preservation (Taguieff, 2001:5).
Since Taguieff locates racism within this discourse of difference, it becomes clear
that racism no longer refers simply to fear or hatred of the ‘other.’ Rather, racism now
operates as both heterophobia and heterophilia – that is, rejection of difference and praise
of difference. “The debates and controversies are … recentered on the intersecting
questions of collective identities and of their defence, of the rights of peoples (the right to
be oneself as the very first), of the mixture and/or crossing of cultures, of the intercultural
and the transcultural.” As arguments of cultural relativism are made, Taguieff suggests,
they draw on the same language as the discourses of ‘race’ (Taguieff, 2001:7).
91.3 IMMIGRATION POLICIES
As one explores expressions of intolerance towards immigrants in a cross-national
perspective, it is clear that the dynamics of prejudice differ vastly across national borders,
even as regional similarities emerge. In an analysis of the International Social Survey
Programme’s 2003 survey on national identity, Laczko uncovers relatively strong
regional similarities within each of the three regions identified (Eastern Europe, Western
Europe, and North America) (Laczko, 2007:5). Observations such as these inevitably lead
to the question, why some regions exhibit more intolerance towards newcomers than
others.
According to Castles and Miller, the answer is to be found in the role immigration
has played in a country’s history. They argue that the challenge immigration poses to
national identity is weightier than those issues typically blamed on immigrants (such as
increasing housing costs, overloading of social services, crime, disease, and
unemployment). In a definition that echoes the concept of ethnic nationalism, they argue
that national identity is grounded in the idea of cultural and political unity – “ethnic
homogeneity” through language, traditions, values, history, beliefs and culture (Castles
and Miller, 2003:15-16). In the traditional immigration countries,1 immigration is part of
the founding myth and therefore easier to accept, according to Castles and Miller. When
immigrants enter a country where “powerful national myths” of cultural homogeneity are
central to the nation-building process, however, those myths become threatened because
“they create a people without common ethnic origins” (Castles and Miller, 2003:15).
                                                 
1 By the term ‘traditional immigration countries’ the authors intend, for example, Canada and
Australia – countries whose founders are generally perceived to be immigrants from Europe
(regardless of native population already present in the countries).
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While this notion of ‘founding myth’ may somewhat grasp the issues at hand, it is at best
a partial explanation.
Kymlicka warns against underestimating the importance of multiculturalism in
the case of Canada. Multiculturalism, he argues, is closely related to the value of
individual freedom that lies at the core of “liberal democracies.” Liberalism can “endorse
minority rights in so far as they are consistent with respect for the freedom and autonomy
of individuals” (Kymlicka, 1995:75). As such, they are easily reconcilable, which
explains why the discourse of multiculturalism has been so readily accepted, not only as a
political premise, but also as part of the collective references and national identity
(Kymlicka, 2003).
In Multicultural Citizenship, Kymlicka (1995) outlines three group-specific
rights: special group representation rights (i.e., affirmative action policies); self-
government rights; and poly-ethnic rights. He goes on to stress the difference between
external protections and internal restrictions. As such, while the state may, externally,
protect a given group against the majority or other groups, this protection may potentially
become internalised in the form of restrictions by the group on its own members.
Whereas external protections are sometimes justified to ensure the rights of individual
groups, internal restrictions are unacceptable, since they infringe on the autonomy of the
individual (Kymlicka, 1995). Because these policy implementations of multiculturalism
are so closely related to liberal values, Kymlicka argues, they have been accepted as part
of the Canadian collective references surrounding foreigners and immigrants.
However, not everyone agrees with Kymlicka’s assessment of the Canadian
situation. Hall, for example, argues that Kymlicka exaggerates the degree of acceptance
11
the policy of multiculturalism has achieved amongst Canadians (Hall, 2004). This is also
the main argument in Hjerm’s discussion of multiculturalism, based on an international
survey of attitudes regarding national identity (Hjerm, 2000). He discusses four countries,
two of which have implemented an official multiculturalism policy (Canada and
Australia) and two that have not (Germany and Austria). His conclusion is that although
there are differences between the countries in terms of correspondence between policy
and attitude towards multiculturalism, the differences are so insignificant that no
conclusion can be made that Canadians or Australians support multiculturalism any more
than Germans and Austrians. It is only in his comparison of xenophobic attitudes that
there is a significant difference between the two former and the two latter countries
(Hjerm, 2000).
It is not clear from this research, then, that the policy of multiculturalism is the
cause of the differences observed between the countries. Without making any assumption
about directionality of causality, it is quite possible that the difference is to be found in
the relative levels of xenophobia in each country. However, very little empirical research
has been done that examines the connection between immigration and the roots of
xenophobia (Koopmans and Statham, 2003:2).
1.4 ETHNIC DIVERSITY
More recently, a school of thought has arisen which addresses the complex
interplay between immigration and xenophobia through an examination of ethnic
diversity. While the question of diversity is often at the forefront of these inquiries, its
relatively new place in immigration research means that it is often not articulated as such,
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as is the case with Banting, Johnston and Soroka’s discussion of ethnicity and public
opinion (2005). They set out to test the link between the two in their survey project
‘Equality, Security, and Community.’ Specifically, they wished to test the popular
hypothesis that an increased ethnic minority presence in a community results in lower
rates of support for the welfare system. The hypothesis, which is largely based on
comparative, macro-level, and descriptive approaches – i.e., comparing the levels of
immigrants and welfare programmes in different countries – posits that relatively diverse
societies are less likely to “invest in redistributive and social insurance programmes” than
relatively homogenous ones (Banting et al., 2005:33). The hypothesis assumes that this
erosion of support is due either to minority claims that universal practices discriminate or
to majority claims that these programs transfer resources to ‘outsiders’ (Banting et al.,
2005:34).
To test the hypothesis, Banting et al. operationalise trust, which is argued to be
central to the continued survival of the welfare system, according to two aspects:
interpersonal and political trust. Political trust affects the general support for the
government and its policies (including the welfare system), while interpersonal trust has
to do with, for example, how much we trust a person we meet, depending on the given
situation and who this person is (i.e., gender, skin colour, age, appearance, etc.). Through
their empirical test2 of the hypothesis, Banting et al. make several conclusions. First of
all, “the larger is the visible minority’s local share, the less trusting the majority is”
                                                 
2 Based on the first wave of the Canadian survey, “Equality, Security, and Community,” carried
out by the Institute for Social Research at York University in 1999-2000.
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(Banting et al., 2005:40).3 As such, where the majority dominates, the majority
respondents are more trusting than those who live in areas where a larger proportion is
minority; they are also more trusting than the minority respondents in their community.
(Banting et al., 2005:43).
While ethnic diversity appears to have a direct impact on interpersonal trust,
however, the political trust variable is only marginally affected by it. The inclusion of
support for the welfare state in the analysis shows that “moving from a 100% majority to
a 50% majority leads to a decrease in aggregate support for unemployment and welfare of
about .0025%” (Banting et al., 2005:51). As such, the conclusion reached by Banting et
al. is that ethnicity does not pose a threat to the welfare state (Banting et al., 2005:52).
Instead, they conclude, ethnicity affects interpersonal trust since this type of trust has a
much larger contextual component than political trust and ethnic diversity plays a
significant role in this context (Banting et al., 2005:50-51).
These findings, and in particular the conclusion that interpersonal trust is eroded
by the presence of ethnic minorities in a community, problematise the relationships
among minority presence, public opinion towards those minorities, and policy. In
particular, this conclusion indicates that the presence of an ethnic (visible, immigrant)
minority in a community plays a role in how the majority thinks about the minority. The
majority population’s opinion of immigrants in general, then, is formed on the basis of
the immigrants a person observes and interacts with in his/her local community.
However, in order to say anything meaningful about the relationship between minority
                                                 
3 Note that the authors define both minority and majority in all-Canada terms rather than
operationalising it according to each location’s dynamics. This is problematic, particularly in
Canada where ethnic groups have historically settled in enclaves.
14
presence, public opinion, the construction of collective identity and the impact of these
on national policy about immigrants, several aspects are missing from the discussion.
One such important aspect is how the minority is perceived by the majority.
Simply put, different types of immigrants (with different origins, cultural and ethnic
expressions, etc.) are stereotyped differently and carry different stigmas. The composition
of the minority population is important, as is the level of diversity – for example, if
immigrants from the Middle East are stereotyped in a way that makes the majority
population fear them, and they simultaneously make up a large part of the minority
population, then it seems quite likely that the minority population as a whole will be cast
in those negative terms.
The research presented by Putnam in his article on diversity in the United States
(2007) relies on the same oversimplification of the diversity concept as the research
conducted by Banting et al. Addressing similar dynamics, Putnam’s findings show that
“in ethnically diverse neighbourhoods residents of all races tend to ‘hunker down’”
(Putnam, 2007:137). However, while Banting et al. work with a concept of ethnic
diversity that draws on the officially accepted definition of visible minority in Canada,4
Putnam simplifies the concept even further, employing the U.S. census’ fourfold
definition. Diversity, then, is operationalised as Hispanic, non-Hispanic black, non-
Hispanic white, and Asian (Putnam, 2007:145). While this definition may have been
dictated by the availability of data, the shortcomings of such a one-dimensional definition
of diversity are not addressed by Putnam. However, one must ask how well the diversity
of the population is truly captured in four categories.
                                                 
4 The 2001 census used 25 such categories to individual ethnic origin.
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Naturally, it is impossible to operationalise the concept in a way that takes into
account all the differences that exist among different locations, but much may be gained
from simply abandoning the macro-perspective. As such, Marshall and Stolle’s analysis
of a neighbourhood in Detroit (2004) casts doubt on Putnam and Banting et al.’s ‘conflict
theory’ – i.e., that increased diversity leads to increased strife and distrust between
different ethnic groups (Putnam, 2007:142) – in favour of the less popular ‘contact
theory’, which argues that increased contact leads to increased social trust (Putnam,
2007:141). Focusing on familiarity as a vehicle for trust (2004:128), Marschall and Stolle
attempt to define a ‘knowledge-based trust’ through an examination of “the combined
effects of neighbourhood context, levels of neighbourhood sociability, and interracial
experiences” (2004:128, 144). Since their findings are not entirely clear-cut – whites and
blacks generally respond very differently to living in a low-income, diverse
neighbourhood – the results shed doubt on the rather simplistic conclusions that arise
from macro-level approaches (Marschall and Stolle, 2004:145-6).
A similar conclusion can be drawn from recent research by Reimer, Burns, and
Gareau (2007), based on the Canadian 2001 census, which attempts to operationalise
diversity according to ethnic background, religion, and immigrants’ country of origin.
Further, the study adopts a micro-level approach by carrying out the analysis at the
census sub-division level. However, while such definitions may strengthen the analysis,
Abu-Laban and Gabriel caution that we must also be wary of over-emphasising
difference.
“Diversity” can reflect a number of points of difference among people
… [including] gender, age, place of birth, ethnicity, culture, education,
physical ability, social class, religion, sexual orientation, language,
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place of residence, citizenship status, political ideology, domestic
relationships, and personal style and attributes. Indeed, the list could
be endless if we consider how every person is unique. (Abu-laban and
Gabriel, 2002:13)
As such, when employing the term ‘diversity’ as a central concept in one’s
research, several considerations must be made: which type of diversity is being
investigated? Whose definition of diversity is being explored? What level of
measurement is appropriate to capture the dynamics under investigation? Every
sociological concept is subject to overgeneralisation, obviously, but ‘diversity’ is
particularly problematic since it attempts to categorise the very idea of uniqueness and
differences.
1.5 RETHINKING DIVERSITY
While often unarticulated and derivative, the concept of diversity is clearly
intrinsically linked to research on immigration and intolerance. The concept of
nationalism is based directly on the observation of differences among groups – cultural,
linguistic, ethnic, etc. – as is the research on prejudice and stereotypes. Even more
apparent in this context is the debate around multiculturalism, which in the Canadian case
was implemented as legislation as a direct consequence of the linguistic and ethno-
cultural diversity of the country. In these theories, diversity forms a subtle, yet
unambiguous and important undertone. As such, much can be gained from putting the
concept front and centre in our analyses. However, as recent research employing diversity
as a central concept has shown, a better definition of diversity is needed before it is
employed as a tool in future analyses.
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The concept needs to be clearly defined in order for us to operationalise it in a
way that will yield significant findings. The first step must then be to clarify what one
wishes to accomplish with the analysis. If the research addresses differences among
linguistic groups, an operationalisation that defines diversity according to ‘race’ will
likely not lead to any clear conclusions. Similarly, a study of the diversity amongst
immigrants in a receiving country should not simply define diversity according to major
ethnic groups in a country. Naturally, the availability of data may limit the ability to
operationalise concepts at regional or local levels, just as the level at which the analysis
can be conducted may be dictated by the data available. While macro-level data is more
readily accessible to the researcher, it will often fail to capture the nuances between and
within regions. The research by both Banting et al. and Putnam employ a national
definition of diversity, while regional differences may mean that a particular constellation
of diversity will be perceived as less diverse in one region than in another. This will
naturally be more problematic to some research than other, depending on the research
question one is addressing and the hypothesis one wishes to test.
In this research project, the central issue surrounding diversity is anchored in the
receiving population’s perceptions of their own identity and their perceptions of the
immigrant population. On this basis, diversity has here been operationalised as two
concepts, the interaction of which makes it possible to think about diversity within the
context of the receiving population’s experience: intradiversity and extradiversity.
Drawing inspiration from theories of ingroup/outgroup dynamics (Patterson and Bigler,
2007; Taylor and Moriarty, 1987), the hypothesis posits that people’s perceptions of the
diversity of their community or country are separated according to ‘self’ and ‘other.’
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Intradiversity refers to the receiving population’s perception of itself in terms of
homogeneity or heterogeneity. Extradiversity, on the other hand, refers to the receiving
population’s perception of the degree of diversity of the ‘other’ – in this case the
immigrant population. While past research has focused on one or the other, it is important
to understand how the two dimensions together shape responses to immigration.
The way in which the receiving population in a country responds to immigration
is shaped by the generally perceived intradiversity and extradiversity as it plays out in
dominant discourses, legislation, and popular opinion, insofar as the two terms are
expressions of ingroup and outgroup dynamics in a community. The perception of
diversity thus operates at many levels of society. The expectation is that if the receiving
population’s dominant perception is of low intradiversity coupled with perceptions of low
extradiversity, attitudes towards immigrants will be more negative, while perceptions of
higher levels of diversity of either, or both, will result in more positive attitudes towards
immigrants and immigration.5
1.6 CONCLUDING REMARKS
In this chapter, a number of theories were discussed that each attempt to explain
why some countries experience backlashes against immigrants while others do not. From
an account of the dynamics of nationalism to a discussion of the effect of ethnicity on
interpersonal trust, these theories each represent aspects of the causal relationships by
which attitudes and discourses can be explained.
                                                 
5 While the hypothesis clearly outlines four possible scenarios, the focus of this project is on
Denmark, which is hypothesised to have low intra- and extradiversity, and Canada, which is
hypothesised to have high intra- and extradiversity.
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However, when reading these theories as an exploration of the dynamics within
which attitudes and discourses are negotiated rather than attempts to describe cause-and-
effect relationships, the underlying element of diversity becomes apparent. An
operationalisation of this concept as an expression of the receiving populations’
experience of the national identity and the identity of the immigrant populations creates a
theoretical context and working hypothesis within which it is possible to explore and
discuss how discourses and attitudes are shaped in different circumstances and locations.
The comparative aspect of the analysis presents the opportunity to explore the
dynamics of the diversity hypothesis within two communities that, at first glance at least,
appear to express two very different iterations of intra- and extradiversity. Before
examining the dynamics of the hypothesis in the two sets of data, it is essential to better
understand the two countries’ discourses on immigration and national identity. The next




DANISH AND CANADIAN APPROACHES TO DIVERSITY
In terms of approaches to immigration and ethnic diversity, Denmark and Canada
differ vastly. In Denmark, the presence of a political party with an outspoken anti-
immigration policy line, the Danish People’s Party (DPP), within the coalition
government has contributed to a restrictive immigration policy and a discourse of
national protectionism and essentialism. The Canadian multiculturalism discourse, at the
opposite end of the spectrum, emphasises respect for cultural expressions to the point
that, for some observers, it can be argued to border on cultural relativism, as in the case
of a recent Supreme Court ruling on the Sikh Kirpan.6 Because of these large differences,
a comparative analysis of the ways in which the two countries’ populations understand
and operate within diversity will shed light on the core dynamics that affect these
attitudes and approaches.
The review of past research on the question of intolerance towards immigrants
(chapter one) lists a number of factors that are hypothesised, under some circumstances,
to affect attitudes and discourses. However, while it is easy to point at the two countries
and find a plethora of dissimilarities that may explain the different attitudes – the massive
difference in landmass that leaves Denmark, a country of roughly 5.5 million people,
feeling heavily populated in comparison to Canada, the second largest country in the
                                                 
6 In 2006, the Canadian Supreme Court ruled in the case of a 12-year-old schoolboy versus his
school district that banning him from carrying the Kirpan, a dull ceremonial dagger carried by
many baptised Sikh men, would be against the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.
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world by total area, and its estimated 34 million inhabitants, as an example – the key
issue is rather to understand the underlying dynamics at play in shaping each country’s
approach to diversity, immigration, and national identity.
In 2003, the International Social Survey Programme asked respondents in both
countries what they thought of their country’s immigration rate.
Table 1: Attitudes about immigration rates.
While the largest proportion of both populations wished it remain the same
(38.8% in Denmark and 40.4% in Canada) and a similar, equal portion of each population
wished for a small decrease (22.1% Canadians and 23.4% Danes), the significant
observation is that a full 28% of Danes wanted a large decrease in immigration while,
conversely, 20.4% of Canadians wanted a small increase in immigration. This may seem
an negligible finding, if not for the overall immigration trends to the two countries:
N % N % N % N % N % Gamma p.
Canada 50 5.2 195 20.4 387 40.4 212 22.1 114 11.9
C-I a 4.0-6.8 18.0-23.0 37.3-43.5 19.6-24.9 10.0-14.1
Denmark 16 1.3 104 8.5 475 38.8 286 23.4 342 28.0
C-I 0.8-2.1 7.1-10.2 36.2-41.6 21.1-25.8 25.5-30.6
a Confidence interval
Do you think the number 
of immigrants to [country] 







little Decreased a lot
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Table 2: Inflow of immigrants to Denmark and Canada as a percentage of total population.7
Table 3: Proportion of total population born outside Canada and Denmark.8
Annually, Canada receives a higher number of immigrants, not only in actual
numbers but also as a proportion of the total population. As a result, the portion of
Canadians born outside Canada is three times larger than the equivalent group in
Denmark. In this light, the finding that more than one quarter of the Danish population
wishes to decrease immigration by a lot indicates that this comparatively smaller portion
of the population constitutes a larger concern amongst the receiving population than is
the case in Canada.
                                                 
7 Source: OECD "Trends in International Migration" SOPEMI, 2004: Table A.1.1. BEF1
(Statistics Denmark), CANSIM 051-0001 (Statistics Canada). Data from Canada is based on
residence permit sources. Data from Denmark is based on population registers.
8 Source: OECD "Trends in International Migration" SOPEMI, 2004: Table A.1.1. BEF1
(Statistics Denmark), CANSIM 051-0001 (Statistics Canada).













Total (thousands) 4342.9 4971.1 5448.5
% of total population 16.1 17.4 18.2
Denmark
Total (thousands) 198.9 259.2 321.8
% of total population 3.9 4.9 6.0
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Before delving into the analysis of the dynamics surrounding immigration,
identity, and diversity in the two countries, it is important to understand the national
contexts within which the discourses and attitudes are shaped in each country. Two very
different, powerful, national myths are at the core of each population’s attitudes and
discourses about immigrants. In Denmark, the generally accepted understanding is that
the country and its population’s culture is the result of a long history, within which its
people has remained homogeneous. In Canada, on the other hand, the pervasive
perception is that the country is founded on immigration and that everyone in Canada can
trace his or her family history back to more or less recent waves of recent immigration.
2.1 CANADA: A COUNTRY OF IMMIGRANTS
Canadians rarely question the fact that Canada is an immigrant nation.
We are a country that celebrates “diversity” and “multiculturalism” as
important elements of our national character. (Walker, 2008:11)
This opening line of a book about Canadian history and immigration illustrates
the notion prevalent in Canadian discourses, both on national identity and immigration; at
its core, Canada is a country founded by immigrants. The discourse is reproduced by
Knowles, who writes,
The prehistoric ancestors of Canada’s present-day Indians and Inuit
became this country’s first immigrants when they journeyed to
America by way of the Bering Strait. (Knowles, 1992:1)
No Canadian, according to this prominent discourse, is unable to trace his or her
roots to immigration. However, this discourse is relatively new and considerably different
from most of the country’s history (Walker, 2008:11).
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The arrival of French and English settlers in Canada in the late 16th century
marked the beginning of a tumultuous struggle in the Canadian nation’s history. The
competition for the landmass culminated in the French cessation of its North American
colony to the British in 1763 at the end of the Seven Years’ War. Since then, the various
waves of immigrants arriving in the country were faced with the national project of
replicating British society in the colony. Before the Canadian Citizenship Act in 1947,
Canadians were defined as British subjects and the general consensus amongst authorities
was that cultural, racial, and ethnic diversity were detrimental to national unity (Dewing
and Leman, 2006:4).
A number of occurrences in the post-war period began a shift in this picture.
Particularly, Canada experienced a significant economic boom between 1961-1973, and
the need for economic immigration coupled with large waves of immigrants, initially
from Europe and soon followed by migrants from non-Western countries, began to erode
the notion of ethnic homogeneity (Dewing and Leman, 2006:4; Kelley, 1998:311). Being
a country that spans from the Atlantic Ocean to the Pacific Ocean, immigrants were
coming by boat from the East and the West. As Canada gradually opened its borders to
economic immigrants, several ethnic, cultural, and aboriginal groups in Canada began
voicing their desire for official recognition.
Most important of these, the Quebec nationalist movement and Quebec’s Quiet
Revolution were large contributors to the government’s decision to form the Royal
Commission on Bilingualism and Biculturalism (the Laurendeau-Dunton commission) in
1963 (Knowles, 1992:168). The main mandate of the commission was to recommend a
future direction for Canada that would ensure the “equal partnership between the two
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founding races, taking into account the contribution made by the other ethnic groups to
the cultural enrichment of Canada and the measures that should be taken to safeguard that
contribution” (Petrovic, 2009:23). The commission’s reports, published in 1969,
“recommended the ‘integration’ (not assimilation) into Canadian society of non-Charter
ethnic groups with full citizenship rights and equal participation in Canada’s institutional
structure” (Dewing and Leman, 2006:4).
Pierre Elliott Trudeau, newly elected Prime Minister, decided to move ahead with
a new federal policy that would recognise every cultural group in Canada as an
enrichment of the national experience, and not only the two charter groups (French and
English). On October 8, 1971, he announced the new policy of multiculturalism within a
bilingual framework:
The policy I am announcing today accepts the contention of the other
cultural communities that they, too, are essential elements in Canada
and deserve government assistance in order to contribute to regional
and national life in ways that derive from their heritage and yet are
distinctly Canadian. (Trudeau, in Knowles, 1992:168)
The commission’s reports gave rise to an “innovative ethnocultural policy” in
Canada, the main points of which were summed up by Dewing and Leman:
• To assist cultural groups to retain and foster their identity;
• To assist cultural groups to overcome barriers to their full
participation in Canadian society; …
• To promote creative exchanges among all Canadian cultural
groups;
• To assist immigrants in acquiring at least one of the official
languages. (Dewing and Leman, 2006:4-5)
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These ideological objectives were paralleled by various practical implementations
to ensure the operation of the policy at various levels of government and the creation of
programs to remove racial, linguistic, and cultural barriers in society. This was viewed as
a high priority, as more visible minorities began to arrive in the country, some as
economic migrants but many refugees (Dewing and Leman, 2006:5, Kelley, 1998:382-3).
Multiculturalism was eventually included in the Canadian Charter of Rights and
Freedoms, entrenched in the Constitution Act from 1982: “This Charter shall be
interpreted in a manner consistent with the preservation and enhancement of the
multicultural heritage of Canadians” (§27 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and
Freedoms). In 1988, Canada adopted the Multiculturalism Act, officially acknowledging
the role of multiculturalism in Canadian society. The purpose of the act, as summarised
by Dewing and Leman, was to “preserve, enhance and incorporate cultural differences
into the functioning of Canadian society, while ensuring equal access and full
participation for all Canadians in the social, political, and economic spheres” (Dewing
and Leman, 2006:7). The act and its affiliated programs have since come under attack for
being used “shamelessly to buy [ethnic] votes at elections” (Knowles, 1992:187).
Furthermore, a “vocal opposition” in Quebec argues that its emphasis on multiculture
rather than biculture is dismissive of Quebec’s role as one of the founding linguistic and
cultural communities in Canada (Knowles, 1992:187). Finally, a line of criticism argues
that multiculturalism is a divisive policy that emphasises differences rather than unity
because “[the policies] remind Canadians of their different origins rather than of the
symbols of Canadian society and the future that they share” (Knowles, 1992:187; see also
Dewing and Leman, 2006:11). In response to such critiques, a Department of Canadian
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Heritage investigation in 1995 concluded that renewed emphasis should be on social
justice, civic participation, and identity (Dewing and Leman, 2006:8). This latter aspect
implies, “fostering a society that recognizes, respects and reflects a diversity of cultures
so that people of all backgrounds feel a sense of belonging to Canada” (Dewing and
Leman, 2006:8).
Whether this report has significantly altered the government’s approach when
promoting multiculturalism or the critics were not representing a general attitude amongst
Canadians, the prominent discourse today, as mentioned at the beginning of this section,
is that Canada is an immigrant country: “Various publications and polls suggest that
Canadians are generally supportive of a multicultural society, at least in principle if not
always in practice” (Dewing and Leman, 2006:9). However, as Dewing and Leman go on
to point out, considerable doubt exists about what this entails:
… Many Canadians are unsure of what multiculturalism is, what it is
trying to do and why, and what it can realistically accomplish in a
liberal-democratic society such as ours. Multiculturalism can
encompass folk songs, dance, food festivals, arts and crafts, museums,
heritage languages, ethnic studies, ethnic presses, race relations,
culture sharing and human rights.  Much of the confusion results from
the indiscriminate application of the term to a wide range of situations,
practices, expectations, and goals. (Dewing and Leman, 2006:9)
Table 4, below, shows the results of asking Danish and Canadian respondents
whether it is possible for a person who does not share the country’s customs and
traditions to become fully Canadian or Danish.
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Table 4: The importance of shared customs and traditions.
While a significant number of Canadians, 37.3%, agree that shared customs and
traditions are essential to nationality, a full 49.7% disagree. This seems indicative that a
very large proportion of the Canadian population do not identify Canadian identity
according to a clearly defined set of cultural traditions; in this view, the Canadian identity
encompasses a diversity of backgrounds, customs, and cultural expressions. It is not
primarily defined according to a set of ethnic characteristics or a common stock of
traditions. How does that compare to other countries, and in particular to Denmark, where
immigration has not historically played as great a role?
2.2 DENMARK: AN HOMOGENEOUS NATION?
If table 4, above, indicates that half of the Canadian population do not consider a
particular set of customs fundamental to the national identity, the opposite is true for the
Danish responses to the question; fully 61.6% agree that shared customs and traditions
are essential to Danish nationality. The conviction of homogeneity evident from this
response rate reflects an insistence on cultural longevity present in many official accounts
of Danish culture – from school books to the Foreign Ministry’s information brochures,
N % N % N % N % N % Gamma p.
Canada 153 14.5 240 22.8 137 13.0 405 38.5 118 11.2
C-I 12.5-16.8 20.4-25.4 11.1-15.2 35.6-41.4 9.4-13.3
Denmark 382 30.1 397 31.3 101 8.0 214 16.9 176 13.9
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the argument is that Danish culture can be traced back a millennium or more (Knudsen,
2002:6). The discourse is not entirely unfounded:
Denmark has until the end of the 1970s been one of the most
ethnically homogenous countries in the world. According to the
“Global Taxonomy” developed by Gunnar P. Nielsson, the only
Western country that was more homogeneous was Iceland. More or
less all Danes lived in Denmark, were Danish citizens, and had Danish
ancestry. (Togeby, 2003:35)9
Generally, the perceived turning point in Danish immigration history was the
arrival of guest workers in the late ‘60s. The reason for this is not found in the initial
impact of that wave of immigration. The early influx was minimal and the new
immigrants served to fill labour shortages in the manufacturing and primary industries.
The Danish government was unprepared for the immigrants, and it was not until
September 1973, two months before the country closed its borders to economic
immigration in the wake of the global financial crisis, that quotas were implemented for
guest worker immigration. (Togeby, 2004:53).
No strategy existed to integrate the new immigrants, their Danish language skills
remained minimal and they largely settled in ghettos. This became problematic since the
financial crisis led to the termination of many of the jobs filled by these immigrants.
Having settled and brought their families to Denmark, most opted to remain in the
country and apply for welfare rather than to return to their country of origin. Gradually,
the immigration question began to grow in the media and political discourse.
                                                 
9 A brief note on the translation of Danish quotes: whether from literary sources or interviews, all
citations from Danish sources have been translated by the thesis author.
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The hardening tone of the immigration debate was bolstered by the continuing
lack of integration efforts as two large waves of refugees arrived in Denmark, the first
from Sri Lanka and various countries in the Middle East starting in 1984 and the second
from ex-Yugoslavia and Somalia beginning in 1992. In the mid-‘90s the Danish tabloid
Ekstrabladet began a series of critical campaigns about immigrants that culminated in
two article series, “Godhedens pris” [the price of decency] in 1995 and “De fremmede”
[the foreigners] in 1997. The focus was on the welfare dependence amongst refugees and
immigrants as the series aimed to bring the issue on to the public agenda. However, the
tabloid painted extreme examples of welfare abuse as representations of the behaviour of
entire ethnic populations (Togeby, 2004:57). The debates fortified the ‘us versus them’
mindset and the perception became generally accepted that the source of racism and
xenophobia in the Danish discourse was the problems the ‘guests’ caused for the Danish
‘hosts’ (Hervik, 2002:179).
Characteristically, in the Danish media’s treatment of the question of
immigrants, refugees and immigrants are viewed as people that create
large, damaging problems for the Danish society. It is “them” that
cause problems for “us.” The problems may change, but the
characterisation of them as serious problems is unaltered. (Togeby,
2004:54)
This discourse about problematic immigrants was articulated by a Member of
Parliament, Espersen from the Social Democratic party, when he asked in 1991 whether
Denmark would be able to help more refugees if the country refused entry to those
refugees he referred to as “convenience refugees.” The hardening tone in the political
discourse was heightened in 1995, when the DPP was founded. The new party’s hard line
on immigration was instrumental in shaping the discourse, as “attitudes [in Denmark] on
31
the reception of refugees [and immigrants] are affected relatively strongly by concrete
events and by the political interpretation of these” (Togeby, 2004:67). While often
accused of populism and attention-seeking policymaking, the party’s various campaigns
have reflected and promoted an anti-immigration and nationalist discourse during the past
15 years. In its political program, the party writes,
Denmark has, on the basis of a millennia-old tradition, developed as a
very homogeneous and extraordinary society, where the experience of
community and cohesion has been and is an important and natural part
of life. Through generations there has been a large degree of consensus
about the democratic development, about the creation of the welfare
society, about liberties, about the national church, about tolerance and
humanity in our interaction with one another. The basic consensus
about shared values has been crucial in the operation of important
social functions like the maintenance of law and order, tax collection,
and the redistribution policy. (DPP, quoted in Bodington, 2003:23-24).
The question fostered by immigration does not just concern “the foreigners,” but
rather the impact of the foreigners on the Danish population, Danish society, and Danish
values.
Characteristically, in Denmark, the question about the population’s
attitudes and the changes thereof has come to be seen as an essential
part of the problem [in the immigration debate]. Thus, a prevalent
understanding is that the last few years have seen a very large slippage
in the Danish population’s attitudes about immigrants and refugees.
Gradually, the understanding has stuck that we once welcomed the
guest workers with open arms, but that we gradually have become
more and more negative and critical – not to mention racist. (Togeby,
2004:51)
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Today, the Danish national identity is defined as very homogeneous, as
highlighted by the responses in table 4. The distinction between “us” and “them” is
clearly marked in the discourse. In this regard, the stigmatisation of Muslims does not
appear surprising to those who have now long observed the Danish political and social
scene. Muslims are particularly targeted, not only because they represented an important
faction of the immigration total, but because their religion and traditions seem to most
clearly set them apart from those of European descent. Already in 1979, for example, a
Member of the Danish Parliament, Mogens Glistrup, said, “Muslims multiply like rats in
this country, through family reunification and births” (Jyllandsposten, 07/02/08). More
recently, the DDP warned that the inclusion of Muslims in Danish society entails an
acceptance of the “bigotry that characterises the fundamentalist religions that, over the
last decades, have trudged into Denmark and created sectarian environments without
solidarity with the Danish society (DPP, quoted in Bodington, 2003:25).  As such,
The debate about “the foreigners,” which is predominantly equivalent
to the debate about Denmark and the Danish society’s encounter with
the Arab-Muslim world, has also become a political battleground with
fundamental, value oriented questions as one fulcrum and the handling
of concrete problems as the other. (Knudsen et al., 2009:9)
An example of one such confrontation of values occurred when the Danish
newspaper Jyllandsposten (JP) published a story accompanied by twelve drawings of the
Muslim prophet Mohammad on September 30, 2005. The story was a response to Danish
author Kåre Bluitgen’s difficulties in finding an illustrator for his book about the Muslim
prophet. In response to his frustrations, the newspaper contacted 40 Danish illustrators,
asking them for a drawing of Mohammad. The resulting twelve submissions were
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published with an article lamenting self-censorship and the loss of freedom of speech.
The problem, according to JP’s cultural editor, Rose, is that some Muslims reject the
modern, secular society. They demand special treatment in terms of respect for their
religion, something Rose argues is irreconcilable with Danish society, where one must be
prepared to be the subject of ridicule. Otherwise, Rose warns, “we are on our way down a
slippery path, where no one can predict what the self-censorship will end with”
(Jyllandsposten, 09/30/05). The crisis resulted in an international uproar during the spring
of 2006, when Muslims in a number of countries around the world protested and burned
Danish flags while demanding an official apology (DR, 02/08/06).
The article at the centre of the cartoon crisis highlighted how a pivotal aspect of
the Danish immigration discourse is the presence of the Danes as an element in the
discourse. Events such as the cartoon crisis serve to reinforce the argument among
proponents of this discourse that the stable Danish identity, based on generations of
traditions and customs, is threatened by the inflow of various immigrant groups, most
important of which are the Muslims.
2.3 CONCLUDING REMARKS
With regards to their immigration histories, Canada and Denmark are two
immensely different countries. The terminology employed by Castles and Miller seems to
apply very fittingly here: both countries have “powerful national myths” that describe
their origins and justify their current dominant discourses. Aronovitch’s description of
civic nationalism as based on legal principles, equal rights, and citizenship appears to
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aptly describe the Canadian discourse, while the Danish situation seems, to some extent,
to reflect the ethnic nationalism that is a question of heritage and ancestry.
Within the context of the diversity hypothesis, the two populations’ experience of
their national identity confirms, at the most superficial level, the thesis about intra- and
extradiversity. In Denmark, the dominant discourse is negative towards immigrants and
immigration and policies have followed that same trend. While the dominant discourses
describe the Danish ethnic community as highly homogeneous, a similar homogeneity is
assigned to the immigrant population, which is largely identified as Muslim. As such,
Denmark is an example of a country where perceptions of intradiversity and
extradiversity are both low.
Canada, on the other hand, is a country that former Prime Minister Joe Clark, in
his election campaign in 1979, described as a “community of communities.” As
discourses over the past six decades focused increasingly on multiculturalism, more
ambiguity exists about the perceived homogeneity or diversity of the self and the other,
discourses are more open and policies encourage immigration and integration. In the
context of the diversity hypothesis, Canada is an example of a country with high intra-
and extradiversity.
In comparing these two countries to answer the research question – what are the
dynamics within which discourses and attitudes about immigration are shaped? – the
hope is that the diversity hypothesis helps to shed light on the interaction between the two
pillars of the project, the negotiation of national identity and attitudes toward
immigration and immigrants.
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Naturally, conclusions based on a brief review of the most recent events in the
two countries’ histories and discourses need to be substantiated through a more extensive
and systematic analysis of public opinions. Through a combination of quantitative and
qualitative analyses, this research project aims to do just that. A brief discussion of the
methodological decisions made in the research process will be presented next, followed
by accounts of the findings of the analytical process.
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CHAPTER THREE
METHODOLOGY: TRIANGULATING QUALITATIVE AND QUANTITATIVE DATA
Comparative studies present the opportunity to gain a deeper understanding of the
mechanics of intolerance and responses to immigration, as differences and similarities
within different contexts highlight the ways in which various factors impact the
development and negotiation of opinions and discourses. In spite of this, projects
adopting an international comparative approach are scarce. The problem is that in
comparative studies such as this one, where data is drawn from two different countries,
reliability is always an issue. From problems regarding cultural and normative differences
between the two research locations to basic issues of translation and different data
gathering methods, the risk of drawing erroneous and misinformed conclusions is always
a significant factor in comparative international studies. In this context, triangulation
reduces the risk of errors, strengthens the conclusions drawn through the corroboration of
conclusions from multiple data sources, and allows the researcher to explore nuances that
may otherwise be hidden when using a single-method approach. As Griffiths et al.
explain,
Triangulation is most useful when the methods employed have
different strengths and weaknesses such that the strengths of one
method remedy the weaknesses in another. A common weakness of
quantitative measures is that valuable information is lost in the process
of quantification. This loss of information can be particularly
damaging to measures of complex concepts. To assess the severity of
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this loss of information, qualitative data and “methods triangulation”
should be employed. (Griffiths et al., 2008:228)
Generally, triangulation falls within one of four categories: data or source
triangulation, where more than one data source is used; investigator triangulation, where
multiple researchers carry out the research; theory triangulation, where multiple
theoretical perspectives are used to interpret the data; and methodological triangulation,
the use of two or more research methods (Perlesz and Lindsay, 1999:27). Using any of
these approaches, or a combination thereof, the researcher is able to broaden the scope of
the analysis and gain a better understanding of the phenomenon being studied (Ma and
Norwich, 2005:212). It may even be argued that triangulation allows for a better
understanding of social phenomena through multiple observations, since a single point of
observation will only offer a glance at a still-life version of phenomena that in their
nature are in a constant state of fluctuation and change.
In consideration of the benefits of triangulation and the ability, through this
methodological approach, to “bridge the falsely assumed schism between quantitative
and qualitative procedures” (Ma and Norwich, 2005:212), this project relies on two
different data sources, one quantitative and one qualitative, using two different methods
corresponding to each data type. Each data source is valuable to the project, since they
serve a different purpose in the final analysis, and both, together, make the research more
nuanced, detailed, and comprehensive. This chapter will briefly address each of the two
methodological approaches, describing first the source data and selection process and,
secondly, the methods used.
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3.1 QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS
Any time a study aims to compare different locations such as, in this case, two
different countries, a major threat to reliability and source of error is the discrepancy
between data sources from each location; different approaches to the data gathering
process, variations in the definition of core terminology, and expressions of local
normative systems are but some examples of the ways in which the comparison of data
from multiple locations can distort the analysis. Being able to draw on data that is
gathered for the specific purpose of a comparative analysis is therefore an enormous
advantage. While researchers often struggle to locate secondary data that satisfies all the
requirements for the analysis – locations, subject matter and variable topics, international
comparability, etc. – such a dataset exists that addresses the questions attitudes
surrounding immigrants and national identity in Denmark and Canada.
3.1.1 SOURCE DATA
The quantitative aspect of the present analysis draws on a dataset gathered by the
International Social Survey Programme (ISSP), a self-funded research network
comprising researchers from 45 countries that carries out annual surveys in all member
countries on subjects such as social networks, family and gender roles, social relations,
etc. (International Social Survey Programme, <http://www.issp.org>). The dataset used
here is the 2003 survey on national identity. The survey was carried out with
representative samples in 33 countries. It was collected in a variety of ways, depending
on the country in question. For this analysis, only data from Denmark and Canada were
analysed. The Danish section of the project comprises 1322 respondents and was
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collected by postal survey, with a response rate of 66.4%. The Canadian data was also
collected by postal survey, and the 1211 respondents amount to a response rate of 43%
(ISSP, 2003:I-27, I-41).
While the samples from both populations are statistically representative samples,
the high rate of refusals and incomplete surveys, particularly in the Canadian dataset, is
indicative that some segments of the population are underrepresented. Since there is no
way of knowing the exact socio-demographic circumstances of the 57% that did not
complete the survey, the low completion rate constitutes a potential source of error.
The Danish sample was drawn from the Central Population Register, a national
register of all Danish citizens. The sample was a simple random sample and no filters
were applied. Conversely, to compensate for the population differences between
provinces and guarantee that all provinces had sample sizes that allow for regional
analysis, the Canadian sample was drawn by province and gender. The final Canadian
sample was weighted adjusting for province and age.
The source survey questionnaire is comprised of 23 questions (with an extra
question pertaining to the European Union for respondents in EU member countries),
covering a wide range of aspects about being a citizen or national of the country in
question. This includes such items as attitudes towards the political system, attitudes
towards immigrants and policies pertaining to immigration, questions of pride in national
accomplishments and establishments, and requirements for national identity (i.e., what it
takes to “truly” be a national of that country). Various socio-economic indicators are also
measured, including political affiliation, community type and size, income, education,
age, etc. (ISSP 2003:2-308-9). The final selection of variables was based on an initial
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descriptive analysis of various variables pertaining to the questions related to the
diversity hypothesis and the two practical operationalisations of intra- and extradiversity
in the data – national identity and attitudes about immigration.
Some of the variables had to be recoded, since the values differed between the
two countries. For example, income was measured in local currency, so the scores within
the variable had to be standardised; this means they were organised according to their
placement within the overall distribution of the responses in the sample. More
importantly, the community size variable did not overlap on all values. The result is a
measure of community size that contains a very large category for mid-size communities
(50,000-499,999) and two small community measures (<9,999 and 10,000-49,999). It is
possible that the large mid-size value will hide differences between different sizes of
communities within that category, and it is important to bear this in mind when
interpreting the results of the analysis.
3.1.2 DESCRIPTIVE ANALYSES
Given that the quantitative analysis relies on secondary data – that is, data that is
not gathered specifically for this research project – the analysis is largely a data driven,
exploratory analysis. As a first step, a series of descriptive analyses allow for a more
thorough understanding of the variables in the dataset, and the ways in which they
interact within the comparative context.
Most variables used in this analysis are ordinal – the values within the variable are
ordered from high to low, so that a given value can be ranked in relation to the other
values. In this context, crosstabulations with a test of significance, the gamma test, shed
light on the degree to which observed differences between the two countries are
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significant. The gamma value is a measure of the strength of correlation between ordinal-
level variables. Ranging from –1 to +1, the distance of the gamma value from zero is an
indication of the strength of the correlation. The calculation of confidence intervals
makes it possible to expand on the conclusion reached by the gamma test results.10
Confidence intervals are an expression of the variation of the distribution of responses
within each value when generalising the findings to the total population. As such, what
may appear as a significant difference between the two populations may well prove to
overlap once taking into account the margin of error of reducing a country’s population
into a representative sample.
3.1.3 PRINCIPAL COMPONENTS ANALYSIS
While carrying out the descriptive analyses to explore the data, a review of
existing research on the topic shed light on the ways in which past research has addressed
this type of analysis. Since the dataset has several series of questions that seem to address
the same theoretical concepts, past research using the data has relied on scales to address
concepts such as national identity, immigration, citizenship, and intolerance. However,
since this research project also aims to explore a variety of explanatory models, the
decision was made to carry out a principal components analysis. This type of analysis
measures the concepts with multiple indicators, thereby showing whether there is
statistical support for the conceptual scales. As such, it lends itself well to exploratory
analysis and results are in a format that allows the researcher to work further with the
data.
                                                 
10 Two variables, income and age, are not ordinal and therefore require a different test of
significance, the t-test. These variables are reported in table 10 in appendix three.
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Principal components analysis is a form of analysis that measures the degree of
covariance within a set of variables – that is, the degree to which the variables appear to
measure the same underlying concepts. It was conducted to examine whether the
questions devised to assess the two main factors, national identity (with six items) and
openness towards immigration (with four items) are revealed in the factor structure in
both countries. The analysis assessed if the same indicators that were used in the two
countries will translate the two hypothesised concepts. The analysis helped construct the
composite measures of national identity and openness towards immigrants that served in
the quantitative analysis.
The form of principal components analysis used here is maximum likelihood
principal components extraction with oblimin rotation. All ten variables were analysed
together, while the analysis was run separately for each country in order to be able to
gauge differences between the two countries. The variables’ association with the factors
is determined by the factor loadings, since factor loadings below .30 indicate that the
variables are only marginally affected by the factor. To confirm the groupings indicated
by the observed eigenvalues, Cronbach’s alpha, a psychometric estimation of the
consistency of the factors’ items, was calculated for each group of variables analysed.
In order to gauge the difference between the two countries, means were calculated
on each factor within each country. A t-test, which tests whether the observed values in
Denmark and Canada differ significantly from the null hypothesis (that no difference
exists between the two countries), was used to determine whether Canada and Denmark
are significantly different on the two factors.
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3.1.4 LINEAR REGRESSION
In chapter one, a number of explanatory models were explored and discussed. The
data available in the ISSP dataset allows the testing of some of these, such as the role of
national pride, political affiliation, and community size, as well as a number of socio-
economic indicators like income and work status, within the context of the ISSP data.
The complex modelling through linear regression makes it possible to test the variables in
a more realistic manner, within the context of other predictors. As such, it is possible to
examine whether the findings from the first steps of the analysis are constant across
different social groups in the two countries.
In order to verify situations where the two countries show significantly different
patterns, this analysis was carried out in three steps. In the first iteration, the main effects
– family income, education, political affiliation, community size, national pride, age, and
gender – were tested. The second step included the country aspect, as interaction effects
were added into the analysis one by one. Finally, the third model included all those main
effects and interaction effects that were significant in step one and two.
In conjunction with a measure of significance of each variable within the model, a
coefficient of determination, R2, provides an estimate of the percentage of the variance in
the two concepts that is explained by the predictors. The analysis of variance, ANOVA,
is used to test the degree to which the observed values within the model differ from
expected values predicted by the null hypothesis.
Combined with the descriptive analyses and the principal components analysis,
the regression analysis offers a very complete understanding of the ways in which the
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indicators of attitudes towards immigrants and of national identity interact with major
socio-economic predictors within the context of the two countries.
3.2 QUALITATIVE ANALYSIS
A problem often encountered when using secondary data is that the researcher is
not able to design the survey with the present research project in mind, nor to adapt and
modify questions in order to clarify responses, concepts, or other issues that arise during
the analysis. As such, one major purpose of the qualitative section of this analysis was to
remedy this rigidity of the quantitative data. Through a series of key informant
interviews, it was possible to address questions that could not be answered with the
quantitative data and adjust for new information as it appeared in the data.
Throughout the spring and summer of 2007, twenty semi-structured key
informant interviews were carried out – nine in Denmark and eleven in Canada. Since
this aspect of the research is relatively limited in scope, a random selection of
respondents would not be guaranteed to yield information pertinent to the hypothesis and
research question. Instead, the respondents were selected specifically due to the way their
work pertains to issues surrounding immigration and immigrants. All the informants
work with immigration to some extent. As civil servants, journalists, politicians,
researchers, and consultants, their work brings them into contact with issues surrounding
the dynamics of attitudes about immigration and integration on a daily basis. As such,
much consideration was given to balancing the samples in the two countries, so that
different types of informants were present in the samples from both countries.
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Before carrying out the interviews, the project, data gathering methods and data
storage, as well as all relevant documents (interview guides, consent forms, information
sheets, and questionnaires – see appendix one) were subject to an ethics approval
application, submitted to Concordia University. Once approved, interviews were first
carried out with Danish respondents during a visit to the country, followed by the
Canadian interviews once the interviewer returned to Canada. Most interviews were
carried out face to face in a quiet setting, using a voice recording device to capture the
conversation. The interviewer also took notes on important aspects of the interviews
during and after the interviewing process. Three respondents were unable to meet with
the interviewer, and these interviews were conducted by phone (see appendix two11). All
respondents received a document with an outline of the research project and researcher
contact information. Once they signed the consent form, they also received a copy of said
form.
As mentioned, the interviews were carried out as semi-structured interviews, and
all lasted between one and two hours. An interview guide was drafted to ensure that
questions that arose during the initial review phase were addressed during the interviews.
The key themes intended to be addressed in the interviews were 1) the interaction
between legislation, political and media discourse, and public opinion; 2) the discourse
surrounding multiculturalism in the country; and 3) the notion of diversity. However,
since the respondents are key informants, working in the field in one way or another, the
general approach was to let the informants’ knowledge and answers steer the interview.
This approach proved to be enormously successful since the respondents contributed a
                                                 
11 Since some respondents requested anonymity, the names in appendix two and the forthcoming
analyses are pseudonyms.
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wealth of information to the analysis. Once the interviews were completed, all
respondents were asked to fill out a short questionnaire. Considering the sample size, the
data gathered through the questionnaires cannot be generalised to the broader population.
Rather, the purpose of the questionnaires was to ask very direct questions that allow for
the comparison of the respondents on specific topics. While some respondents did not
complete the questionnaire, the information obtained from the questionnaires is both
valuable and interesting.
The interviews were transcribed and imported into Nvivo, data analysis software
for qualitative research. Using this tool, the interviews were coded according to two
criteria: Primarily, given that the respondents were key informants whose knowledge of
the topic was a driving force in each interview, the process of coding was very open,
looking for themes that arose naturally in the course of the interviews. A second goal of
the coding process, however, was to identify whether the themes that arose during the
review of past research – nationalism, trust, prejudice, and ethnic diversity – and the two
central concepts – national identity and attitudes towards immigrants – were present in
the interview data. Once the major coding process was complete, the different themes
were reviewed and relationships between themes were explored.
CONCLUDING REMARKS
The openness of the qualitative interview and coding process stands in sharp
contrast to the rigid frames within which the quantitative analysis had to be carried out,
and combined, the two analyses provide counterpoints and corroboration on themes and
concepts explored in this project. The strengths of one method provides a counterbalance
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to the weaknesses of the other, so that, for example, the small sample size of the
qualitative analysis is backed up by findings in the quantitative analysis that are, in fact,
generalisable to the two countries’ populations.
While each approach is restricted by its methodological boundaries, triangulation
allows researchers to step outside those boundaries and view the phenomenon in question
from a variety of angles. The combination, in this study, of qualitative and quantitative
data further presents the opportunity to study the phenomenon through macro-level and
micro-level analyses, in the hope that this combination will yield a more complete




The qualitative analysis in this project consists of a series of interviews with key
informants in the field of immigration. The respondents’ function as key informants is a
fundamental element of the analysis, as the hope is that the findings from the qualitative
analysis will serve to fill gaps in the findings from the quantitative analysis. Since the
data for the latter is secondary, collected for other research projects than the present, the
questions presented to the survey respondents do not directly address the main focus of
this project. The key informants constitute a font of knowledge about issues of
immigration, integration, citizenship, policies, media discourse, etc., in the two countries.
The informants’ backgrounds are briefly described in appendix three.
Three major themes stand out in the analysis of the semi-structured key informant
interviews, surrounded by a myriad of sub-themes. The major themes recur across all
interviews, albeit differences exist in the articulation of these themes. First, the question
of multiculturalism emerges as a key theme. Within the discussion of the concept, its
definition and role in the two societies, two exceedingly different models of
multiculturalism materialised. According to their prevalence amongst the respondents,
the models have been labelled the Danish and Canadian model, respectively.
Counter to the large differences in views on multiculturalism between the two
countries, diversity emerged as a relatively cohesive theme among most all respondents.
As a concept, it proved less complicated to define than multiculturalism. However, while
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the theoretical discussion of diversity in chapter one is based on an ethno-cultural
definition of diversity, the definition offered by the informants in the interviews also
includes a dimension of desirability: diversity is not merely a fact that is or is not present
in society (so as to say, for example, that a given community is very diverse because its
inhabitants are very varied in ethno-cultural background). Rather, diversity is a question
of understanding difference as a positive element in society.
The third major theme has to do with integration. The discourse on immigration is
anchored within the question of integration, and the theme highlights the ways in which
the two countries’ discourses differ on the issues surrounding these phenomena.
This chapter will present a systematic account of the three themes, describing and
defining the key aspects of each theme. Furthermore, two sub-themes that arose
predominantly from the Danish interviews are explored, since they shed light on some of
the possible ways the dynamics in the two countries differ.
4.1 MULTICULTURALISM
Since the study compares Denmark with Canada, a country with an official policy
on multiculturalism, the question of multiculturalism was addressed in every interview. If
the concept did not come up without probing, the interviewer would ask about the way
the respondent defines the term and how the respondent conceives of the concept within
the national context. These probes were sufficient to spur discussion about the concept.
The interviews have revealed two models of multiculturalism. One, labelled the
Canadian model, is the one subscribed to by all Canadian respondents and some Danish
respondents. The second model, labelled the Danish model, is employed by four of the
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Danish respondents. Further, the Danish model is described by some of the Danish
respondents that subscribe to the Canadian model as being the generally accepted but
incorrect understanding of multiculturalism in Denmark.
Generally, Canadian respondents did not question whether or not Canada is or
should be multicultural. For most, it was implicitly or explicitly assumed that Canada is a
multicultural country:
I think that the decision had been made long ago that Canada was
going to be that kind of country that it welcomes people from different
countries. The issues of multiculturalism versus melting pot meant that
you didn’t have to give up your culture of origin to become a good
Canadian. And I think there has been a significant buy-in for that kind
of policy. (Walter-C)
Similarly, several Danish respondents describe Denmark as multicultural,
although perhaps in a less straightforward manner. For example, Robert does so in a
critique of the Danish government’s stance on the question:
There’s a reluctance that runs through the liberal party, and of course
the Danish People’s Party, and partly also the Conservative Party,12
against accepting that Denmark is a multicultural society. … I think
that’s like putting your head into a bell jar, because Denmark is
characterised by having, alongside what we understand as Danish
society based on Danish values, a number of parallel societies.
(Robert-D)
Two other Danish respondents reach the conclusion in less certain terms.
Discussing the way in which the openness of some Danish legislation allows for cultural
expressions, Amanda concludes that “… Denmark is unintentionally multicultural
                                                 
12 The three political parties that form the current coalition government in Denmark.
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because, for example, we’re the country in Europe that has the highest number of Muslim
independent schools. And then that’s because we have a law about independent schools
that permits it.” While basing his argument on different observations, Victor arrives at an
equally hesitant conclusion that Denmark is multicultural by following his line of
argument to its end:
We discuss in Denmark, and we have for many years, whether we’re a
multicultural society or a multi-religious society, or whatever. It has
never really been defined what we actually are. There are some that
think we’re a multicultural society. We might as well accept it, and
then we work on it from there. But it’s not like a fundamental fact that
we’re a multicultural society. ... I don’t think it’s very important to
preoccupy ourselves with such terms. I think what’s important is the
practical aspect. I have been to meeting after meeting and discussed
theoretically if we’re a multicultural or multi-ethnic or multi-religious
society. ... I think it doesn’t really matter how you define it. What is
important is how you operate. ... I don’t know where to set the limit for
being a multicultural society, but there are about 500,000 people with
foreign background in Denmark. And there are all shades, from
Swedish to all kinds of others, Africans, etc. I don’t know if it’s
enough to say that we’re a multicultural society, but at least multi-
religious, if multi means that we have many religions, and multi-
ethnic, I guess we are that too, but that’s kind of the same as
multicultural. (Victor-D)
Common for these three respondents is that they do conclude that Denmark is
multicultural, but they are unclear of the mechanics of multiculturalism in Denmark.
Surprisingly, this ambiguity is mirrored by the Canadian respondents. The certainty that
Canada is a multicultural country is accompanied by ambivalence about what this really
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entails. William, who maintains that Canadians would all agree that Canada is
multicultural, says,
I think the word multiculturalism is very interesting in the sense that it
is so broad and is so vague that it is open for interpretation, [and] if
you ask [Canadians] what it is I think, either you would get all
different kinds of answers, different definitions, or no one can actually
pinpoint to you, because it is a concept. … It doesn’t say in practice
what it is but it is a vision that this is, you know, we should respect,
but how do you measure respect and where do you draw the line?
(William-C)
Similarly, Kevin emphasises the vagueness of the concept:
I know multiculturalism is a very vague and broad term and it is
difficult [to say] how the individual sees it. I think multiculturalism is
the acceptance and the respect for all cultures and that all cultures are
equal in the respect that they are given within the society. So it is the
tolerance and respect for the variety of cultures given. That they are all
under one set of institutions and one law, which is what we pride
ourselves for in Canada, that we are able to strike the right balance
respecting the various diverse cultures and religions and ethnicities we
have, but at the same time maintain a solid foundation and consistent
set of laws and rules that apply to everybody equally. (Kevin-C)
As Kevin and William try to pinpoint the elements of multiculturalism, they
reveal some of the fundamental facets of the Canadian model: elements of respect for and
acceptance of difference and equality are at the core of the Canadian model of
multiculturalism. Finally, Kathleen pinpoints a crucial element of the Canadian model:
How do I define multiculturalism? I define it as a variety of cultures
living together in an environment of acceptance and tolerance,
harmonious. … I don’t see it as a policy. I see it as coming from the
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individuals within the community, and it has to be in an environment
that is at least accepting and tolerant. (Kathleen-C, emphasis added)
The italicised phrase above highlights what is one of the two main differences
between the Canadian and the Danish models: the level of society that multiculturalism is
seen as emanating from. The Canadian model clearly emphasises the role of the
individual, and multiculturalism is a function of the individuals in society. Conversely,
the Danish model describes multiculturalism as a function of the cultural groups present
in society. While disagreeing with the Danish model, Peter describes how ethnicity, in
Denmark, is ascribed according to group-based stereotypes such as clothing, foods, and
music. When proponents of multiculturalism in Denmark voice their argument, he
explains, they draw on these stereotypes to show that Denmark is indeed multicultural:
On the political left wing in Denmark there’s a battle for multiculture.
We want multiculture, which I think is a nonsensical argument. It
makes no sense. It is still carried by stereotypes, understood in the way
that we want ethnic stores, we want to support these different things
(Peter-D).
Similarly, when explaining why Danes generally do not define the country as
multicultural, Amanda explains, “We don’t want to recognise cultural difference here, as
such. … We have this principle of equality in Denmark, that we all should have equal
opportunities and also, in some way, should look alike” (Amanda-D). The emphasis of
the Danish model is not on individuals in society and the differences between them, but
on the issues surrounding the cultural differences between groups. Considering what an
overwhelming amount of differences exist between individuals in any given society, this
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distinction between the two models may very well account for the respondents’ difficulty
in defining the Canadian model of multiculturalism.
Aside from this crucial difference between the two models, many of the core
elements of the Canadian model are mirrored by the Danish model. This includes the
acceptance of and respect for difference, equality and equity, and the desire to avoid
cultural relativism. It is perhaps because the respondents that subscribe to the Danish
model do not consider these elements of respect and equality to be present in Danish
society that they reject the notion of a multicultural Denmark; even more so if the notion
of equality implies sameness, as Amanda suggested above. Michael says, “We’re not a
multicultural society. We’re not, but there are several cultures and several backgrounds
that need to live here, and there will be more in the future. There’s no doubt about that”
(Michael-D). Maria echoed the same sentiment:
I can only speak for myself [about whether] we’re becoming a
multicultural society. No, we’re not. Not yet. I don’t think so, but I
think we’re on our way. I think we already will see some changes in
20 years, when there’s some integration that’s gotten to work for all of
us. (Maria-D)
Although not articulated by most Danish respondents, an implicit element of the
Danish model, which reveals itself in the above quotes, is the notion of choice – society
has to choose to be multicultural. The only Danish respondent to clearly articulate it,
Caroline says,
There’s no real debate about multiculturalism. Yes, there are some that
say we are a multicultural society, let’s get it out, and the desire to be
able to be different. ... It’s as though, here, it’s a question about, should
we be multicultural or monocultural. (Caroline-D)
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This is the second major element by which the two models can be distinguished.
The assumption of the Canadian model is that the country is multicultural as a function of
its past. It is not debatable, nor is it questioned. Instead, the Danish model suggests,
implicitly or explicitly, that the country (or perhaps its government) has to make an on-
going decision whether or not to be a multicultural nation.
One respondent brought up a topic that was not addressed by any other
respondents. However, since the topic may help define the two models further, it warrants
a brief description. Heather was the only respondent to address the issue of race relations
in Canada. Without rejecting the Canadian model, she explained how her skin colour had
let her see a different Canada than that which is described by the model:
I think in … most part Canada is a good place in terms of race
relations, better than a lot of other places, but it isn’t perfect, and I
think we often like to compare ourselves to the Americans and then
think ourselves the better because we are more perfect than they are,
but that is not the reality for most Canadians. For a lot of Canadians,
especially Canadians of colour, is not one of ‘it is all fabulous.’
(Heather-C)
This caveat of the Canadian model begs the question, whether the Danish model’s
emphasis on the differences between cultural groups rather than individuals allows it to
address questions that are ignored by the Canadian model. The Danish model’s emphasis
on groups may serve to highlight tension mong groups in society, which may also in part
explain why those that subscribe to the Danish model reject the view that Denmark is
multicultural.
While not addressed directly by any respondents, this difference in the emphasis
of the two models may go a long way towards explaining the negativity towards
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immigration in Denmark. The cultural emphasis of the Danish model highlights the
ethno-cultural subgroups that form as immigrants arrive in the country, and as such it is
hard to ignore the element of immigration in the Danish model. On the other hand, we
may suppose that the Canadian model would not change if Canada decided to close its
borders tomorrow.
In conclusion, one may be tempted to compare Canada and Denmark in another
way. Canada has put in place its policy of multiculturalism in explicit rejection of the
biculturalism put forth by the Laurendeau-Dunton Commission in the sixties. It is
instructive to note that nowhere in the interviews do Canadian informants address the
question of the Quebec nation and that when they talk about Native peoples, it’s only to
celebrate a culture that brings, much like the Italian culture or the Greek culture, a
folkloric enrichment to the Canadian nation. The Danish respondents seem to be at this
juncture when Canadians had to choose between recognizing the duality of their nation
(French and English) or propose an alternative model of multicultural enhancement. This
helps to explain why their vision of multiculturalism is in fact very close to the notion of
biculturalism and an understanding of the question in terms of ‘us versus them’. Denmark
is described as multicultural because it now has to cope with foreigners living on its soil,
not because it is intrinsically shaped this way.
4.2 DIVERSITY
While the concept of multiculturalism proved complex in its articulation and
definition across the two groups of respondents, the discussion about the concept of
diversity is less ambiguous. Respondents in the two countries largely agree on the
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definition of the term. While the Danish model of multiculturalism was based on cultural
groups, the Danish respondents all focused on the individuals in society when discussing
diversity. Robert frames the concept in quite positive terms:
Diversity is a place, where there is room for everyone within certain
well-defined structures. Those structures are first of all that you have
to accept the democracy and the country’s laws. … You have to have
the mindset that now you live in Denmark, and it’s there your future is,
and you have to be prepared to respect and support the country’s laws.
But I still think there should be room for you to wear a headscarf, if
that’s what you want to do. The personal freedom, I think, has to
remain intact. But you have to have a democratic mindset. (Robert-D)
Diversity, according to this definition, is an expression of personal freedom and
acceptance of differences within certain socially and legally defined limits. Peter extends
the definition further, arguing that since “everyone has an age, everyone has some sort of
ethnic background, everyone has a gender, everyone has a sexuality,” all societies are
diverse (Peter-D). The definition is echoed by several Canadian respondents. William
suggests,
It is really broad how you define [diversity]. You could include
anything from multiculturalism, you know the concept and how it
manifests itself in our day to day lives, the kind of challenges that we
face, and the type of diversity. That could include cultural diversity,
racial diversity, sexual orientation, faith and religions, even abilities
and disabilities. (William-C)
Barbara backs this definition up, explaining that the municipality she works for
defines diversity as “broad and inclusive. … [Our priority groups] are aboriginal people,
women, racial minorities, people with disabilities, immigrant refugees, lesbian, gay, bi-
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sexual, transgender, two-spirited people, youth and seniors” (Barbara-C). Therefore, to
her, “diversity is more than just immigrants and refugees and newcomers” (Barbara-C).
Furthermore, this diversity is an essential part of society that is promoted because,
“it is necessary to make sure that our diverse society works. … Diversity is one of the
issues people discuss about their community” (Walter-C). When promoted in this way,
Martin suggests, diversity has the potential to be a positive development for society: “[It
is] something that helps muddle the picture, as a new addition to the perspective we have
to our work or educational system. [Diversity is when] difference becomes an asset and
not a problem we have to overcome” (Martin-D).
An important point to note here is that this definition of diversity leaves no room
for the sense of choice that is present in the Danish model of multiculturalism. When
diversity is a question of difference, a community either is or is not diverse. However,
Peter goes on to warn that the definition of diversity as an expression of visible
differences is lacking.
In many contexts, for many of the tasks we solve, the starting point is
that diversity... well you need a black person, a Muslim, and you
need... so you need some difference, so you can see that you have
diversity. ... I think the picture of diversity that is being drawn in
Denmark is very misguided. It is a stereotype, and in reality it only
serves to reproduce a long list of problems. ... Every time you say
‘diversity’ in Denmark, it ends up being about integration. And then it
becomes like, a Dane and someone with a [head]scarf, where I see
diversity as much more complicated and much broader. (Peter-D)
This warning is echoed by Christopher, who suggests that the Canadian
population’s overwhelming support of diversity fails to ask the question, “diversity of
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what? Skin colour? Different way of cooking? Different songs? Or different ideologies or
different conceptions of the world?” (Christopher-C).
Adding to this complex critique of the way in which diversity is generally defined
in the two countries, Martin adds a further criticism. While the concept of diversity itself
may be alluring and something that is viewed as a positive thing, he suggests that the
reality is very different:
There is an inner contradiction [in the way people understand diversity
in Denmark]. Ideally, they want people to come with a different
attitude and to hire people that are different. But in reality, they want
to change people to that which already is. Ideally, they want people
that are different, but in reality, in practice, they want to remove these
differences and make the group homogenous. They have an idea that
it’s a good idea to have a different attitude, but it’s more an idea than
something that is expressed in practice. (Martin-D)
Much as William described multiculturalism as it is understood in the Canadian
model as an elusive concept (above), the definition of diversity presented in the Danish
discourse appears to reflect an ideal rather than the actual situation. Similarly, Heather’s
example of the issues surrounding race relations in Canada (above) indicates that the
presence of an ideal of positive diversity in the Canadian discourse does not imply that
the actual situation in the country is without problems.
Respondents in both countries brought up the question of exposure to diversity as
a way in which attitudes towards immigrants adjust. Echoing the contact theory proposed
by Marschall and Stolle (above), Maria says,
I think it’s very local or regional, how you view it. For example, here
in Copenhagen, there are a lot of radical voices and there’s a lot of
what has been called ‘Halal-hippies’ and such. In Jutland, I don’t think
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there’s the same awareness. ... Maybe it’s a phenomenon that belongs
to the larger cities because you live in a more multicultural society
than you do out in the countryside. So I think they have a different
awareness of how they speak about each other. (Maria-D)
This idea about geographical overlap of population diversity and openness
towards diversity was brought up by Kevin as well:
I think that our attitude towards that debate [about striking a balance
between diversity/pluralism and equality] and towards that challenge is
what makes us more successful than others. [I absolutely see this
reflected in the general population’s attitude towards immigrants],
although I would argue that the attitude level varies depending on the
region and is directly related to the local population of that region. So
if you go to a region or an area where there is a lot of immigrants and a
lot of diversity, you will see a much more open attitude towards
understanding this concept, and if you go to a region where it tends to
be more homogeneous and consistent or status quo or original
population, you will see that there is perhaps less understanding of that
concept. (Kevin-C)
Building on that same geographic/demographic argument, Kathleen offers the
example of a neighbouring community:
Very little diversity, quite middle upper class, not a lot of tolerance for
any change at all, including immigration and diversity. Even the
municipalities that I have exposure to that are further out of [the large
urban centre], they talk about immigration as something that will never
really hit them. … It is not embraced, and when I look at the [my own]
community, we are so far beyond that. I am not saying that there is not
intolerance of diversity but it is accepted. (Kathleen-C)
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This last quote touches upon one of the most striking differences between
Denmark and Canada, one that directly relates to the conclusion of the preceding section:
just like Denmark seems to be closer to the concept of biculturalism than
multiculturalism, the discourse of diversity put forth by Danish respondents seems to be
much more connected to the concept of duality. Whereas the Canadian respondents do
not systematically refer to one specific group to illustrate what diversity is about, the
consistent example provided by the Danish respondents is of the Muslims population in
Denmark. While the definition of diversity employed by both groups of respondents is
the same, built on an individual-oriented understanding of difference, the discourse
within which this concept is anchored relies on the same group emphasis that is at the
heart of the Danish model of multiculturalism.
4.2.1 DIFFERENCE AND SAMENESS
From the way in which several respondents speak about diversity, it is clear that
the concept is closely connected to the question of difference, an aspect that was directly
addressed by several Danish respondents. Amanda points out, “in some way it’s also a
paradox, how we want to have room for differences, but under certain conditions. That’s
what I see as the Danish model, that we create room for differences, but at the same time
we define what is culturally allowable” (Amanda-D). As Martin pointed out above, when
embracing diversity the tendency is to actually strive for sameness. This tendency,
Caroline suggests, originates in the connotations of difference and sameness:
It is interesting to look at the children, and see where our perceptions
originate. ... Children generally view sameness as something good and
difference as something bad. If you look more closely at discourses of
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tolerance, you can see the same in adults’ discourses. When it comes
to arguments in favour of tolerance, then they say: we are not so
different after all, we’re pretty similar. Bottom line is that we’re all
human, and we all have the same needs for this and that. There is this
implicit understanding of equality as something that is good and
invites to good relations, and that difference is divisive, that alterity is
a little dangerous. ... You also hear it when you say: ‘even though
we’re different, we can still be together.’ It’s always there, that
differences aren’t a positive thing. (Caroline-D)
Amanda touches upon the same desire for sameness: “The idea of equality as
sameness, that’s kind of a basic notion for the Danes. And therefore, we have a hard time
managing anything that sort of goes beyond what we define as our collective projects”
(Amanda-D). In extending this discussion to the issue of immigration, Amanda sums up
the consequences,
Here at home, we immediately talk about integration, but we really
mean assimilation. It’s the idea about how [immigrants] have to
become like us, they have to learn to be like us. They are kind of
measured according to the extent to which they live up to Danish
values. (Amanda-D)
Consequently, there is very little tolerance for people that fall outside the norm.
When speaking of Danes that have converted to Islam, Amanda says,
They are considered either crazy or dangerous or as someone who has
simply become an immigrant. There is much close-mindedness
regarding what categories we can belong to here. You can’t be both
the one and the other. That’s where you’d think you could say that
Danes who become Muslims are a beautiful example of integration
working both ways. But I don’t think that’s the way it’s seen.
(Amanda-D)
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This debate about difference was echoed by one Canadian respondent, Heather,
who explained how the understanding of difference affects the Canadian concept of ‘the
mosaic:’
[The way that we are taught difference and sameness, diversity,
equality, all of these things, shapes how we respond to people] because
if you are taught that difference is a problem or is something to be
ignored… I mean it is one of the differences between Canada and the
United States. People talk about the melting pot versus the mosaic. I
think we have a broader acceptance for a mosaic notion than I think
the United States does. It isn’t totally ‘come here and you have to give
up everything and pretend,’ so there is a little tiny embracing of
difference as such, but I think the challenge is because it is
performance at one level, like it is a [basic] level one notion of equity
and inclusively. (Heather-C)
In other words, when people are taught that difference is problematic, a lot of the
ideals about difference that are hailed in society in general become a matter of a social
performance to live up to these shared ideals. A person’s understanding of difference and
sameness dictates how he or she operates within the context of diversity and
multiculturalism, and this behaviour reproduces the discourses, for better or for worse.
An anecdote offered by Peter illustrates this point, while underscoring Taguieff’s (2001)
argument that heterophilia is based on the same ‘othering’ as heterophobia:
The interesting thing is how we understand difference and how we
operate within the difference. I remember a neighbour that visited us
often and said ‘ooooh…’ He loved visiting us because it was so
foreign, it was something completely different, and it was Jewish
culture. I couldn’t understand why my dad found him so irritating. I
thought it was positive. It was only later that I realised, what if you
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don’t want to be a representative for… you don’t want to be exotic…
It’s not a circus. In truth, that neighbour was a hick. To him, we were a
circus. …
My example of our happy neighbour was a picture of a man who
confirms himself as being so open to other cultures, but in the
openness towards other cultures there’s a stigmatisation that is just as
destructive; even though it’s positive, even though it doesn’t seem
discriminating, he reproduces certain problems. (Peter-D)
Related to the question of negative difference, a sub-theme that emerged in the
Danish interviews, the question of values and value conflicts within the context of
immigration was entirely absent from the Canadian interviews. However, given the
emphasis on values in Danish media and political debates, it is not surprising that several
respondents offered insight into the discourse surrounding values. In his critique of the
Danish government’s stance on multiculturalism, Robert says,
Denmark is characterised by having, alongside what we understand as
Danish society based on Danish values, a number of parallel societies.
The big challenge for the future will be to unite them without
compromising on what we consider the core of Danish values. That’s
also why you’ve seen a value conflict in Denmark lately: we’re in
favour of registered partnerships, we’re against the death penalty,
we’re in favour of freedom of speech, etc., etc. … The struggle in the
future will be about diversity, understood in the way that it’ll be about
which values should count in Denmark. Where should we bend our
neck, and where should we not bend our neck. (Robert-D)
Echoing the Danish model of multiculturalism and positive diversity as an ideal to
strive for rather than a reflection of the concrete situation in Denmark, this explanation
understands the dynamics of diversity as a struggle between groups with different values.
65
Tony echoes this view of the situation in Denmark, arguing that the question of religion is
at the fore in this confrontation, which he in essence views as a struggle between Danish
and Muslim values:
I think the Danes are generally very positive towards immigrants.
Research shows that too, but I also think the Danes are very worried
about other things. It’s about religiosity, etc. … When Brian
Mikkelsen13 speaks about value struggles and culture struggles, and he
thinks it’s about school newspapers,14 then it just shows that he doesn’t
get it. This is about completely different issues, and you can see that
about the burqas and veils and scarf conflicts we’ve had. We will see
more of it. About the cartoon crisis, also. We will see more of it
because it’s a clash between different values, and it’s not something
that’s been addressed in Denmark. We’ve had the attitude that we’re
all the same, but we’re not all the same, damn it. People have different
attitudes about religiosity and humour and satire and what have you.
(Tony-D)
Anchored in the debate about Danish versus Muslim culture, there is clearly a
very real concern about values in Denmark. Supporting this argument, Peter suggests that
Denmark’s Muslim population is, in fact, too significant in the public awareness: “For the
work on diversity, I think it’s been a problem that there’s been so much focus on the
integration of refugees and immigrants with Muslim background, primarily. Because it’s
important, and it’s a large problem in Denmark. … But it also means that there’s no focus
on globalisation and diversity” (Peter-D).
                                                 
13 MP for the Danish Conservative Party, Minister of Culture at the time of the interview.
14 This controversy arose when the Minister argued that we needed to address issues of values in
Denmark because leftist, socialist values were too dominant – supported by anecdotal evidence
from his experience of being denied the right to circulate conservative school newspapers in high
school.
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However, while the value conflict is evident in the interviews, Tony’s critique of
Mikkelsen shows the vagueness that surrounds the concept of values itself. In fact,
Michael argues, it is entirely misunderstood.
The laughable aspect about norms and values is that, for example,
when the Danish People’s Party feels that it’s a Danish value not to hit
your children, it’s not more than 15 years since they voted against a
law to outlaw it. In other words, 15 years ago it would have been a
Danish value to beat your children. … If you say ‘Danish values’ you
have to analyse it. You have to say, there is someone that defines the
Danish values as those values we have today. And that means that
women should be able to bathe topless on the beach. That’s then a kind
of Danish value. It’s completely ridiculous. It’s completely over the
top. If people want to, then that’s ok by me, and if they don’t want to,
then that’s actually allowed too, and if they don’t want to look at it,
then that’s even legal too. But that’s not a value, but it has become that
in some people’s view. It’s not values. Many translate values,
especially the Danish People’s Party, but also some right-wing
politicians, to whatever it is we think today. (Michael-D)
As already discussed in chapter two, the value discourse is pervasive in the
Danish debate on immigration. The ambiguity of the concept evident from Robert and
Tony’s descriptions of the situation, coupled with Michael’s analysis of the situation,
however, imply that the concept of values itself is nowhere as clearly defined as the
conflict surrounding it.
4.3 INTEGRATION
As a general rule, the interviews found their starting point in the very broad
question of immigration and immigrants in the context of the respondents’ experience at
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a personal level and their country at a more general level. As such, issues surrounding
immigration and the integration of immigrants, both in the national context and in a
comparative perspective, were discussed. Interestingly, while issues of immigration were
touched upon by most respondents, all focused on questions that emphasised integration.
This seems to imply that the respondents all consider the problematics surrounding
immigration to hinge more on the integration of immigrants into society than on such
questions as the number or type of immigrants arriving in the two countries.
Respondents in both countries emphasised a need for immigration as a central
aspect of immigration policies. Barbara suggests that the population understands the need
for immigrants and are positive towards immigration because of it:
I think there is more openness to accept immigrants and this partly has
to do with the reality in Canada. Because of the low birth rate and the
growth in the elderly population we have to count on immigration as a
source of population growth.
Interviewer: Do you think that the average Canadian thinks about
those factors when responding to a statement like that?
Respondent: I think the media has been spreading this idea. I think
more and more, people seem to be getting it. And there is also the
labour force. We need immigrants to be entering the labour market
because there has been a shortage of labour. (Barbara-C)
Kevin sees the same trend:
I certainly believe that we have come a long way as a nation in
recognition to the value and the need for immigrants, so I see that
trend to continue and as I said, statistics tell us that immigrants are not
only…[it is] not a feel-good exercise where we welcome people. It is
an economic necessity and it is a cultural and social necessity. So there
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is a real purpose here, a real benefit, a selfish benefit for us as a nation,
to attract good immigrants. And yes, it offers good opportunities to
new immigrants also. We need them. So I think this recognition is
growing and in fact, I think it is well established in Canada and I
suspect that we will continue to grow. But there will always be debate
on how we attract immigrants, which immigrants we attract, what the
purpose is of attracting immigrants. That is a healthy debate and the
fundamental issue of needing immigrants and attitudes towards
immigrants, I think that has been very well established here [in
Canada]. (Kevin-C)
A similar positive effect of the need to import labour was identified by several
Danish respondents. Robert and Victor make the distinction between those immigrants
that work and contribute to society versus those that “arrived here, never got a job, and
never became a part of the Danish society” (Victor-D):
I don’t think there’s any desire to go further [in restricting immigration
to Denmark], I think most Danes say “we’ve tightened where we
needed to tighten.” But I don’t think there’d be support to open the
gates again. …
When I say ‘gates,’ I talk about refugees. If we talk about people that
come here to get a job in a field where we’re missing workers, then I
think the attitude is different. People generally understand that. We
need well-educated doctors from India, etc. (Robert-D)
Michael similarly speculates that the economic need for immigrants will lead to a
more positive attitude towards them, simply because “we can’t keep thinking that all
foreigners are terrible, if they’re going to be taking care of us in the nursing homes”
(Michael-D). However, the economic need for immigrants does not ensure a well-
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integrated immigrant population. Underscoring the emphasis on integration, Walter
argues,
We should no longer measure how well we are doing on the
immigration file with the number of immigrants we receive here every
year. … We need to start measuring the success of immigrants. How
well they do after they arrive here. The issue is not the number of
immigrants. … There is no debate that Canada needs immigrants. …
It’s indisputable. In less than ten years, 100% of the increase of labour
force needed will only be coming from immigrants. There is no debate
whether we need immigrants or not. The challenge, I think, and the
opportunity that we are facing, is that we are going to make sure that
we integrate these immigrants successfully so we are able to benefit
from them. (Walter-C)
One way to ensure the successful integration of immigrants, Walter suggests, is to
focus on certain types of immigrants. Immigrants arriving through the family
reunification program, he argues, stand a better chance of integrating into Canadian
society than other types of immigrants:
Lately, as a matter of official policy, we’ve underrated the matter of
family reunification. Years ago, the sense was that immigration was a
benefit for the Canadian economy, for family reunification and for
protection of people whose lives were in danger around the world. I
think lately, … you often hear about the needs of the economy, we still
hear about the need of protection, but we hear less about family
reunification, and I think family reunification has often proven to be
the more successful of the immigration programs. I think that from
looking at statistics and from the program in the past. People who have
immigrated here and joined family have tended to be happier
immigrants, they tend to … adapt to life in Canada faster. They don’t
have the same work expectations as someone who has been awarded a
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whole bunch of points through the system for their academic training
or their work experience and then come and [are unable] to practice
their professional occupation. … There are huge benefits surrounding
family reunification and it has served us well over the years, and it is a
more successful program in terms of integration. (Walter-C)
A similar argument is made by Martin, as he suggests that family reunification
immigrants in Denmark strengthen the immigration population’s standing in the eyes of
the receiving population:
Today we have two groups [amongst the immigrants] that take a lot of
space in the work on integration. One group is the family reunification
group, self-providing, they arrive in the country because their spouse
has made a commitment to provide for them … [and] the group’s
social profile has grown stronger exactly because the state makes the
demand that ‘you have to provide for your spouse, you have to own a
home,’ and now with requirements about Danish language skills, etc.
… And then we have the group that is the diametrical opposite. The
group that’s stuck in the municipalities, it’s bound, simply. The group
that is very weak. Many have psychosocial problems, many have been
passively provided for by the state for years. … That’s the two groups
that take a lot of space, and you can say that the group with the self-
providing immigrants can function as a locomotive for the rest of the
[immigrant population] because it helps break the ice and set an
example. … And then there’s the group that’s in the municipalities, it
is a social mass grave, I mean, social problems can be inherited by the
next generation. (Martin-D)
Interestingly, this observation runs counter to the official government policy
stance on family reunification in Denmark, as described by Victor:
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Interviewer: Has the main purpose of the government’s policy, as you
understand it, been to reduce immigration generally or to reduce
specific types of immigration?
Respondent: The latter. It has been our purpose to stop forced
marriages – forced marriages and arranged marriages – in the family
reunification policy. … The purpose has been to switch the focus
from, in 2001, having a majority of refugees and family reunification
immigrants, with a small fraction that were students or workers. Now,
85% or those that arrive here are students or workers. (Victor-D)
As some respondents speculate about their respective government’s approaches, it
is clear that the question of how to achieve successful integration is one on which
Denmark and Canada differ. Robert described the Danish method as one of ‘whipping the
immigrants’ into integration:
The government is of the opinion that the immigrants that arrive here,
particularly the refugees, need to be whipped to take a job, because
many of them are pacified by our welfare system. … There’s a larger
focus on getting them a job and getting them an education, etc., and
that’s because you can see in the statistics that there’s a
disproportionate number of refugees and immigrants that stay on
welfare compared to Danes. That’s why they’ve created the ‘Start-up
Help’ [Starthjælpen], so that [the immigrants] get benefits far below
what the Danes receive. Simply to force them to find work or get an
education. I actually think it’s true that there are some, perhaps even
many of the immigrants that have been pacified by our welfare system.
… So I don’t think it’s wrong, in this way, to force people into an
education or job. What is important to bear in mind, though, is that
many of the refugees that arrive in Denmark are people that have had
horrendous experiences in their home countries and have been
subjected to torture and simply damaged on body and soul, so they are
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perhaps not always able to work in the same way that the rest of us are.
And there it obviously doesn’t work to keep forcing them into work
and give them public benefits they realistically can’t survive on. That
is wrong, in my opinion. (Robert-D)
Conversely, Walter’s description of the Canadian government’s emphasis on
citizenship as a tool in the integration process highlights a more collaborative approach to
integration:
Canada is one of the best countries in the world for turning people into
full citizens. Our rate of turning immigrants into full citizens is around
80%. The United States is about 40%, but that might be a bit off.
Many European countries have guest worker programs … where over
generations, people never become citizens. I think the success of our
immigration policy has been [that] we’ve tried to encourage people to
become full citizens of Canada in a relatively short period of time.
We’ve tried to build that attachment to Canada by encouraging
becoming a citizen. I think that’s very important, to maintain that type
of attachment to citizenship. … There are huge benefits to having
people come here and remain here and become citizens. (Walter-C)
These two quotes illustrate how the burden of integration is placed differently in
the two countries. The implicit assumption amongst the Canadian respondents is that
integration is a collaborative process, as illustrated by Walter in the quote above and by
Barbara:
It is hard [to find a solution to xenophobia], and it is so much harder in
these European countries where they have developed their identity for
such a long time. Canada is a country of – well, we should recognise
the aboriginal people too – but by and large, the growth of the
population in the past few centuries has been due to immigration, so
we are a country of immigrants. So we have a fluid collective identity,
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with every wave of people we do a little adjustment. And in our
current immigration legislation we do say it is a two-way process. You
don’t expect people on the other side to come in and change
completely and then we stay the way we are. No, both sides will have
to have some adaptation, so we have, I think, in a way a more fluid
collective identity. I think some people would say Canada is always a
nation in the making. (Barbara-C, emphasis added)
In Denmark, on the other hand, the respondents identified a trend of placing the
burden entirely with the immigrants. Victor echoes the Danish government’s position as
described by Robert above when he says,
I believe that the main responsibility for becoming integrated rests
with the individual that arrives in Denmark. But of course you can’t
become part of the Danish society unless there are some structures
available to you. But if you don’t want to be integrated, and that is
what we have seen for many years, the policies didn’t encourage it,
then you won’t be integrated, because then it’ll be this half-hearted
effort. Here it’s about how you, inside yourself, when you arrive in a
new country, have to say ‘I want to be part of this country, and I will
learn their language, and I will become part of the work force, but I
also need a place to live, and my children need opportunities, and I
also need opportunities to learn Danish.’ (Victor-D)
The question, whether the burden of integration is placed on the immigrant alone,
is perhaps closely related to a sub-theme highlighted by several respondents. Integration,
they argue, is not simply a question of entering the job market. Rather, the social aspect
plays an immensely important role in the integration of immigrants:
If people don’t get integrated, if they don’t make the connection and
settle successfully, they will leave or they will be discarded within our
community. And we need people living together happily and we need
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people’s success. We need them contributing to our economy. We
need people to come in with great credentials to be providing at the
level that they are able. Not working in a factory or driving a taxi. That
is lost human capital, and we cannot afford to take those risks. … I
mean that the view that it is just a matter of time before all works itself
out is a complacent view and certainly the discussion in our
community is that we cannot afford to wait. If we are going to remain
viable, we do need growth, we need more people working, we need
more people consuming and buying homes and buying goods.
(Kathleen-C)
Successful integration, as Kathleen defines it here, has to do with more than
employment. Immigrants have to make a connection with the community, they have to be
happy in their new country, and they need to feel that their “potential” is not being
wasted. The emphasis on social integration is so pervasive among the Canadian
respondents’ view of the Canadian situation, in fact, that William laments the lack of
emphasis on the economic aspect, which results in the taxi driver stereotype described by
Kathleen. He says, “when we talk about immigration, how come we want people to
integrate socially, [living outside ethnic communities,] but at the same time [we] don’t
allow them to integrate economically?” (William-C). The only Danish respondent to
directly touch upon the question of social integration, Maria indirectly critiques the
Danish one-way approach to integration:
There are some that see integration as, you’re just supposed to drop
your old country and your old culture and your old habits and
everything. Now, we use: ‘when in Rome, do as the Romans.’15 … But
we know from all kinds of places, we know from Danes outside
                                                 
15 This is the English expression that best reflects the meaning of the Danish expression, “skik
følge eller land fly” – literally, “custom follow or country flee.”
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Denmark, for example, that they bring [traditional Danish items] with
them, and they make [traditional Danish desserts]. So that’s where the
argument isn’t really solid. … I think at some point, we need a broader
understanding of what is the right way to live. (Maria-D)
The social aspect of integration is then a question of making a connection with
one’s new community and feeling happy in one’s new home. However, as Maria
describes, this happiness entails being allowed to hold on to traditions and cultural
particularities. The Danish one-way approach of placing the burden of integration on the
immigrant fails, in this view, to achieve successful integration, regardless of whether the
immigrants are successful in entering the workforce.
As Barbara emphasises above, the two-way process of Canadian integration is
anchored in Canada’s immigration legislation. Similarly, the Danish legislation on
integration delineates the relationship between immigrants and the receiving society:
The legislation contributes to [an immigrant] remaining an immigrant.
[The government] makes demands that exceed the individual’s
capabilities. … You can pass a test in dansk316 but [they will] still
have the mentality that [you’re part of a certain group]. That’s why
you say what you say or do what you do. They have made some
formal demands and proof of education and qualifications the criteria
for whether people should be part of this society or not. (Martin-D)
Caroline elaborates on this point, that the legislation categorises immigrants as
separate from the Danish population:
The legislation has a primary and a secondary effect. The primary
effect is that it designates immigrants as a problematic group, one that
                                                 
16 Dansk3 is the government-administered test immigrants are given to evaluate their Danish
skills as part of the immigration application.
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needs special efforts, and it designates them as people that have
essential differences from the rest of the population. … [But] it also
puts [the immigrants] in a position where they are necessarily viewed
as dependent on the state. For example, the refugees that cannot look
for work and are removed from society. In that sense, the legislation
has the effect that it marginalises, and then they don’t have access [to
society], and they will be viewed as someone that is outside society
and dependent on the state and living off our money… It homogenises
them and marks them as different from ethnic Danes. It makes them
dependent and poor. People that come from good positions in their
home countries slide down the social ladder and are seen as
problematic families that are socially weak and poor. (Caroline-D)
A point of speculation here might be, whether the presence of legislation that
specifically addresses the integration of immigrants in Denmark has an effect on this
discourse. Canada’s integration policy is mainly anchored in the Multiculturalism Act,
which is a legal document that addresses the nation as a whole, immigrants and receiving
populations. Possibly, this discoursively creates a sense of “us” in the Canadian debate on
integration, whereas the Danish debate instead speaks about “the immigrants”
specifically.
In continuation of her argument that the legislation marginalises immigrant
groups in society, Caroline elaborates on the dangers posed by this marginalisation,
warning that some groups may become resistant to integration.
It is counterproductive to fight for and hold on to a monocultural
society and a Danish society, because the interesting thing about the
Danish society is that it used to be able to suck all these differences in
and incorporate them into the Danish identity. You could be Danish
with a low social background and a high social background. Jews have
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come to Denmark and have taken on the Danish identity, and several
other ethnic groups have done it. But this articulation of the Danish
[identity], and this delineation of the borders surrounding the Danish
[identity], continuously pushes people out and creates opposition
instead, and creates counter-identification amongst the ethnic
minorities, so that it creates more resistance against becoming
incorporated and integrated and adjusted than before, where it was...
where the Danish [identity] wasn’t articulated... or it’s not true that it
wasn’t articulated, but there wasn’t such a great struggle surrounding
the Danish identity earlier. And then perhaps, it was easier to become
Danish. (Caroline-D)
Not only do the Danish immigration discourses and legislation thus serve to
delineate the distinction between newcomers and the receiving population, marginalising
the immigrants in society. It also forces the immigrant population to discoursively define
itself as non-Danish and seek alternate communities of belonging.
4.4 CONCLUDING REMARKS
The qualitative analysis was carried out in an effort to highlight dynamics that are
impossible to address within the available quantitative data. Key informants were chosen
as respondents because their experience and knowledge of the field would allow them to
offer insights and views on the immigration situation, public opinions, and discourses in
the two countries that, when coupled with the quantitative analysis, will hopefully allow
for a better understanding of the dynamics in the two countries. Within the context of the
diversity hypothesis, that the population’s perceptions of intradiversity and extradiversity
shape the responses to immigration in a country, these findings shed light on the
dynamics within which the perceptions are shaped in each country’s context.
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Three major themes emerged from the interviews – multiculturalism, diversity,
and integration. Within the context of these three themes, many of the differences
between the two countries crystallised, allowing for a more nuanced understanding of the
dynamics surrounding immigration and integration in the two countries, as well as the
major ways in which the two countries differ.
In the process of analysis, two very clear models emerged for the way
multiculturalism is understood and debated amongst the respondents – and, to the extent
that they reflect or relay majority discourses, in the two countries. The models explain
much of the variation between the respondents that was, initially, puzzling. The conflict
between Danish respondents that see Denmark as a multicultural nation and those who
outright deny the presence of multiculturalism in Denmark was initially a stumbling
block in the analysis, but proved to be a key element in identifying the two models.
In Canada, multiculturalism is a central element in the discourse about the
national identity. Multiculturalism is, according to this discourse, a function of the
individuals in Canadian society and the differences that exist between each and every one
of them. As such, multiculturalism is a fact that arises from the population composition,
and insofar as it reflects the national identity, it also emphasises respect and equality. In
this way, the Canadian model of multiculturalism echoes the diversity discourse, which is
tremendously similar in the two countries. Diversity, the respondents explain, is a
question of the positive impact of differences between the individuals in society.
In both countries, the diversity discourse reflects an ideal situation of the way
difference may be experienced and understood by the countries’ populations. However,
the Danish respondents nested the diversity discourse within a discussion about the
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conflict between this ideal, positive difference and the generally perceived negative
impact of difference. Furthermore, the debate about diversity is, in Denmark,
accompanied by a focus on the conflict of values between different groups in society.
Mirroring the Canadian debate on biculturalism from the ‘60s that led to the creation of
the Laurendeau-Dunton Commission, the Danish model on multiculturalism emphasises
the conflict between groups – Danish and Muslim in particular – and their essential
values.
In contrast, the only Canadian respondent to reference a specific group was one
that used his own ethnic group as a reference when offering examples of his arguments.
The focus on individuals rather than groups may also explain why no Canadian
respondents addressed two major groups, Quebecers and aboriginal Canadians, in the
discussion of diversity in Canada.
The very different discourses in the two countries are directly reflected in the way
the respondents describe the two countries’ approaches to the question of integration. In
Canada, where the dominant discourse expresses the country’s history as a nation of
immigrants at an individual level, integration is described as give-and-take, a two-way
process where both newcomer and receiving society has to make concessions. The
Danish respondents, on the other hand, paint a picture of the Danish approach to
integration as one that places the entire burden of integration on the immigrants.
Emphasis is on their willingness to learn the language, find a job, and participate in
society. Similarly, the Canadian respondents’ incorporation of both social and economic
aspects of integration – reflecting a sense of ‘complete’ integration into Canadian society
– is not reflected in the Danish respondents’ discussion of integration issues in Denmark,
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where the integration discourse underscores the separation of newcomer and receiving
population and marginalises ethnic minorities.
In the next chapter, the diversity hypothesis will be addressed from the
perspective of a representative dataset, within which findings are expressions of general
attitudes in the two countries’ populations. The findings from these two analyses will
then be discussed within the context of the diversity hypothesis, in order to determine
how the interaction of the two different methodological approaches and data sources may





The ISSP dataset on national identity from 2003 contains a number of measures
on the subject of, amongst other things, attitudes about immigrants and perceptions of
national identity. As operationalisations of the two elements of the diversity hypothesis,
these variables in particular fit well within the scope of this research project and permit
further inquiry into the questions surrounding identity and perceptions of diversity. The
exploratory analysis of these variables show that the themes identified in the qualitative
analysis are indeed present within this larger, representative samples of both populations.
Two central themes materialise through the initial analysis of the data – the
national identity and the attitudes about immigrants. A variety of tests show the ways in
which these two factors, and the variables used to identify them, differ and correspond
between the two countries.
Furthermore, the presence of a number of socio-demographic measures, such as
community size, work status, education, income, political affiliation, and self-identified
degree of national pride makes it possible to create and test some of the explanatory
models proposed in research and literature on this subject. The model is tested on each
factor separately, and the test, linear regression analysis, gives an indication of how the
predictors affect the dynamics of each factor, and how these effects differ between the
two countries.
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5.1 INDICATORS OF ATTITUDES
Within what may broadly be labelled ‘measures of attitudes,’ the ISSP dataset
contains several series of questions. One series pertains to the degree to which a person
can be identified as “truly” a national of the country under a series of parameters –
birthplace, citizenship, language skills, religion, ancestry, and duration of residence in the
country. The second group of indicators addresses the respondents’ attitudes towards
immigrants. These variables were selected for the analysis because of the possibility that
they capture the two key concepts of the project – national identity and attitudes towards
immigrants.
While these variables seem to reflect the two central concepts as well as the two
countries’ dynamics as described in chapter two, the question that must be asked is
whether the indicators of attitudes about national identity and of attitudes about
immigrants express the underlying concepts by which they were selected. A principal
components analysis was carried out, the results of which revealed that the two sets of
variables do not, in fact, correspond to one underlying factor, but rather two separate
factors:
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Table 5: Principal components analysis, indicators of national identity and attitudes towards
immigrants.17
This finding shows that two separate underlying concepts account for the ways in
which people’s attitudes about and perceptions of national identity and immigrants are
                                                 
17 The variables included in the principal components analysis are all coded so that the least open
responses correspond to the lowest value. For variables one through six in table 5 – the six
variables pertaining to national identity – a response of 1 indicates, “Very important.” For
questions eight (“immigrants increase crime rates”) and ten (“immigrants take jobs away from
people who were born in [Country]”) 1 indicates, “Agree strongly.” Questions seven
(“immigrants improve [country nationality] by bringing in new ideas and cultures”) and nine
(“immigrants are generally good for [Country’s] economy”) were initially coded so that 1
indicated, “Agree strongly.” However, in order to have all the variables in the principal
components analysis reflect similar attitudes – where a response of 5 in the initial variables
indicates openness – the two variables were recoded so that 1 indicates, “Disagree strongly.”
Please refer to tables 7 and 8 for the value labels.
Factor 1 Factor 2 Factor 1 Factor 2
.789 -.138 .824 -.007
.798 -.065 .789 -.108
How important is it to have [Country nationality] ancestry to feel truly [nationality]? .730 -.235 .802 .059
How important is it to have [nationality] citizenship to be truly [nationality]? .667 .139 .746 .014
How important is it to be [religion] to be truly [nationality]? .573 -.101 .664 -.003
How important is it to be able to speak [Country language] to be truly [nationality]? .364 .107 .498 .048
How much do you agree or disagree with the following statement: 
Immigrants improve [Country nationality] society by bringing in new ideas and cultures -.048 -.819 .083 .765
How much do you agree or disagree with the following statement: 
Immigrants increase crime rates .044 -.727 .112 .687
How much do you agree or disagree with the following statement: 
Immigrants are generally good for [Country's] economy -.054 -.764 -.143 .862
How much do you agree or disagree with the following statement: 
Immigrants take jobs away from people who were born in [Country] .126 -.773 .293 .279
Percentage variance explained 34.7 18.7 40.7 12.2
Cronbach's alpha .760 .775 .826 .673
Factor inter-correlation
Extraction method: Principal components analysis
Rotation method: Oblimin with Kaiser Normalisation
Canada Denmark
How important is it to have been born in [Country] to be truly [nationality]?
How important is it to have lived in [Country] for most of one's life to be truly [nationality]?
-.187 .455
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shaped and articulated. In accordance with the variables that fall within each factor, the
first has been labelled national identity, while the second is labelled attitudes towards
immigrants. The factor on the question of national identity explains 34.7% in the
Canadian case and 40.7% in Denmark, while the factor on the question of immigrants
explains 18.7% in Canada and 12.2% in Denmark. The two factors show a satisfactory
internal consistency for the measures of national identity in both countries (Cronbach’s
alpha = .826 in Denmark; Cronbach’s alpha = .760 in Canada) and attitudes towards
immigrants (Cronbach’s alpha = .673 in Denmark; Cronbach’s alpha = .775 in Canada).
The factor loadings for factor one, national identity, are very similar in the two
samples, indicating that the underlying factor is measuring the same thing in both
countries – the degree to which the respondents are open to diversity in their national
identity.18 Factor two, on the other hand, has very different factor loadings in the two
countries. In the Danish case the factor measures positive attitudes towards immigrants,
while in the Canadian case it captures negative attitudes. This may be an indication that
the attitudes towards immigrants are articulated differently in the two countries, so that in
Canada people think about the dynamics as not being negative towards immigrants while
in Denmark, conversely, people think about the dynamics in terms of being positive
towards immigrants.
If this is the case, then the factor inter-correlation, reported at the bottom of table
five, indicates that there is a weak negative correlation between the two factors in
Canada; more openness in the national identity is correlated with less negative attitudes.
                                                 
18 The assessment that the factor measures ‘openness’ is based on the directionality of the values
for the variables included in the principal components analysis. Since low values indicate less
openness, the very high, positive factor loadings imply that national identity is articulated in
terms of openness in both countries.
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In Denmark, the correlation between the two factors is much stronger and indicates that
more openness in the respondent’s national identity generally implies more openness in
attitudes about immigrants. The processes by which the two countries’ populations
negotiate these attitudes are thus very different.
However, it is also possible that these findings do not reflect clear differences in
the dynamics surrounding intra- and extradiversity but rather are a function of
methodological bias. This type of bias reflects how a variety of aspects of a chosen
methodological approach – the way the data is gathered, the wording of questions, the
concepts questions describe, the underlying dynamics the questions try to capture, etc. –
are all susceptible to differences between populations surveyed. If such bias is at play,
however, the conclusion remains the same: the observed difference between the two
countries’ factor loadings reflect that the two groups of respondents think about central
concepts such as national identity, immigration, and attitudes about immigrants in very
different ways.
The principal components analysis underscores the presence of to very different
factors, under which the variables load the same way between both groups of
respondents. A t-test of the two composite measures computed on the basis of the
principal components analysis shows that the two countries do not differ significantly in
the measure of national identity, but that the attitudes towards immigrants do differ
significantly between the two countries:
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Table 6: T-test of the composite measures of national identity and attitudes towards immigrants
by country.
To further understand the dynamics within each factor and shed light on the
findings in table 6, it is useful to look at the indicators within each factor. Each variable
was examined within a crosstabulation, and gamma tests were run to determine whether
the differences observed are significant.
5.1.1 DESCRIPTIVE ANALYSIS OF INDICATORS OF NATIONAL IDENTITY
Within the grouping of variables pertaining to national identity, the results of the
gamma test, shown in table 7 below, indicate that a relationship exists between country
and statements reflecting openness of national identity in terms of ancestry, citizenship,
and language. Conversely, the two countries exhibit very similar patterns on the matters
of birthplace, duration of stay in the country, and religion.
However, the values of the confidence intervals for the question on religion –
which in both countries was defined as “Christianity” in the surveys – show that while
the two countries emphasise religion in a similar way, a higher proportion of Canadians
responded that it is ‘very important.’ Given the presence of the debate on Muslims in
Denmark, this finding is surprising. A possible explanation may be the emphasis on the
value discourse described in the Danish interviews; expressed crudely, the important
Mean S.D. t-test (df) p.
Measures of attitudes about Denmark 8.35 2.87
national identity Canada 8.56 2.77
Measures of attitudes about 8.58





matter to Danish respondents in the ISSP survey may not be that immigrants are
Christian, but that they are not Muslim.
Table 7: Indicators of attitudes about national identity.19
                                                 
19 For each country in the 2003 survey, these questions inserted the country’s name (in this case,
Denmark and Canada) and nationality (Danish and Canadian) in the questionnaire.
N % N % N % N % Gamma p.
Q1 Canada 387 36.6 338 32.0 172 16.3 159 15.1
C-I 33.8-39.6 29.3-34.9 14.2-18.6 13.0-17.3
Denmark 482 37.3 390 30.2 339 26.2 81 6.3
C-I 34.7-40.0 27.7-32.8 23.9-28.7 5.1-7.7
Q2 Canada 784 73.8 217 20.4 53 5.0 8 .8
C-I 71.1-76.4 18.1-23.0 3.8-6.5 .4-1.5
Denmark 665 51.4 437 33.7 158 12.2 35 2.7
C-I 48.6-54.1 31.2-36.4 10.5-14.1 1.9-3.8
Q3 Canada 410 38.6 374 35.2 220 20.7 58 5.5
C-I 35.7-41.6 32.4-38.1 18.4-23.3 4.2-7.0
Denmark 452 35.0 492 38.1 301 23.3 45 3.5
C-I 32.5-37.7 35.5-40.8 21.1-25.7 2.6-4.7
Q4 Canada 714 67.2 274 25.8 52 4.9 22 2.1
C-I 64.4-70.0 23.3-28.5 3.7-6.4 1.4-3.1
Denmark 988 76.1 278 21.4 26 2.0 6 0.5
C-I 73.7-78.4 19.3-23.7 1.4-2.9 .2-1
Q5 Canada 235 22.4 206 19.6 224 21.3 385 36.7
C-I 20.0-25.0 17.3-22.1 19.0-23.9 33.8-39.6
Denmark 207 16.3 215 16.9 450 35.4 398 31.3
C-I 14.4-18.4 15.0-19.1 32.9-38.1 28.9-33.9
Q6 Canada 185 17.5 280 26.5 370 35.0 221 20.9
C-I 15.3-19.9 23.9-29.3 32.2-38.0 18.6-23.5
Denmark 420 32.6 332 25.7 412 31.9 126 9.8
C-I 30.1-35.2 23.4-28.2 29.5-34.5 8.3-11.5
-.037 .250
.000.433
How important is it to 
have lived in [Country] for 
most of one's life to be 
truly [nationality]?
How important is it to be 
able to speak [Country 
language] to be truly 
[nationality]?
How important is it to be 
[religion] to be truly 
[nationality]?
How important is it to 
have [Country nationality] 





Not important at 
all
How important is it to 
have been born in 




How important is it to 
have [nationality] 






Similar to the above variables, the questions of citizenship and language both
follow comparable patterns in the two countries. However, while respondents in both
countries rank both elements high, the differences are significant in this case; mainly,
more Canadians find the question of citizenship very important, while more Danes
emphasise the importance of language. As described by Walter (see above, p. 72), the
Canadian discourse on integration emphasises citizenship as a tool in the integration
process. Conversely, as the descriptive analysis indicates, the Danish approach places
more emphasis on language than on citizenship.
Finally, the question of ancestry differs significantly between the two countries.
More emphasis is placed on ancestry in the Danish sample than amongst the Canadian
respondents. This may very well be a reflection of the two very different founding myths,
where the Canadian discourse defines Canada as a ‘country of immigrants’ and the
Danish discourse emphasises a long history of homogeneity. Within the context of the
two countries’ histories, this finding seems to confirm, to some extent, the effect the
national histories have on present discourses. The results in table 7 shed some light on the
t-test finding that the two countries do not differ significantly in terms of their
populations’ openness in their national identity. Differences do exist, on the questions of
religion, birthplace, and the duration of one’s stay in the country; however, on the
individual variables the differences are slight, as indicated by the low gamma scores, and
the patterns are similar in the two countries.
5.1.2 DESCRIPTIVE ANALYSIS OF INDICATORS OF ATTITUDES TOWARDS IMMIGRANTS
Reflecting the results of the t-test in table 6, the second set of variables, shown in
table 8, shows significant differences between the two countries on all four variables. An
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inspection of the responses within each value causes us to amend that conclusion in one
case only: the responses to the fourth question, whether immigrants improve the
country’s society by bringing in new ideas and cultures, demonstrate very similar patterns
in the two countries. Differences do exist, however, as a significantly larger proportion of
Canadian respondents agreed to the question, while a significantly larger amount of
Danes disagreed strongly.
Table 8: Indicators of attitudes towards immigrants.
These four variables show that the Danish respondents, in general, are less
positive towards immigrants than the Canadian respondents. On the question whether
immigrants increase crime rates, the majority of Danish respondents agree, while the
Canadian picture is more nuanced. While 19.6% of Canadians agree and 24.7% neither
N % N % N % N % N % Gamma p.
Q1 Canada 73 7.0 204 19.6 257 24.7 375 36.0 132 12.7
C-I 5.6-8.7 17.3-22.1 22.2-27.4 33.2-39.0 10.8-14.8
Denmark 446 36.5 461 36.1 144 11.3 132 10.3 73 5.7
C-I 32.4-37.6 33.5-38.8 9.7-13.1 8.8-12.1 4.6-7.1
Q2 Canada 135 13.2 484 47.3 275 26.9 120 11.7 10 1.0
C-I 11.2-15.4 44.2-50.3 24.2-29.7 9.9-13.8 .5-1.8
Denmark 100 8.3 271 22.4 283 23.4 270 22.3 286 23.6
C-I 6.8-10.0 20.1-24.8 21.1-25.9 20.1-24.8 21.3-26.1
Q3 Canada 57 5.4 229 21.9 222 21.2 428 40.8 112 10.7
C-I 4.2-7.0 19.5-24.5 18.8-23.8 37.9-43.8 9.0-12.7
Denmark 76 6.0 124 9.8 221 17.6 333 26.4 505 40.1
C-I 4.8-7.5 8.3-11.6 15.6-19.8 24.1-29.0 37.4-42.8
Canada 178 17.0 532 50.9 209 20.0 109 10.4 18 1.7
C-I 14.9-19.4 47.8-53.9 17.7-22.5 8.7-12.4 1.1-2.7
Denmark 251 19.8 508 40.1 214 16.9 134 10.6 159 12.6
C-I 17.7-22.1 37.5-42.9 14.9-19.1 9.0-12.4 10.8-14.5
Q4 How much do you agree or 
disagree with the following 
statement: Immigrants 
improve [Country nationality] 
society by bringing in new 
ideas and cultures
How much do you agree or 
disagree with the following 
statement: Immigrants take 
jobs away from people who 












How much do you agree or 
disagree with the following 
statement: Immigrants are 
generally good for 
[Country's] economy
How much do you agree or 




agrees nor disagrees, just under half of the Canadian respondents disagree with the
statement.
As is the case with the responses to the question whether immigrants improve
society, the responses to whether immigrants are good for the country’s economy show
that more Canadians consider immigrants beneficial for the country. However, while a
majority of Danes consider immigrants positive for society in a social perspective, most
do not consider the immigrants an economic asset for society. This may account for the
responses to the third question, whether immigrants are considered competition for
employment. In Canada, most respondents disagree with this sentiment, while 21.9%
agree to some extent. However, in Denmark only 15.8% agree, and the largest proportion
of the respondents, 40.1%, disagree strongly. Possibly, this reflects the discourse
discussed by Robert (see above, p. 71) that sees immigrants as a welfare burden in
Denmark.
5.2 PREDICTING ATTITUDES
As described in chapter two, many theories exist to explain the ways in which
attitudes towards immigrants are developed and shaped, and several socio-demographic
indicators are argued to be underlying causes of intolerance towards immigrants. For
example, The various theories on nationalism indicate that the ISSP variable on national
pride may be a good indicator of intolerance, while the conflict and contact theories
outlined by Marschall and Stolle (2004), Putnam (2007), and Banting et al. (2005)
indicate that a person’s community dynamics are central in shaping attitudes about
immigrants. While restricted to the variables available in the ISSP dataset, this analysis is
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able to construct and test an explanatory model of a number of indicators. The model is
presented in table 9, below.





Intercept 14.998 8.979 -
Denmark [ref.] - - -
Canada .209 6.534*** -
Community size (less than 9,999) [ref.] - - -
Community size small (10,000-49,999) -.186 -.524* 1.552***
Community size medium (50,000-499,999) .117 -.278 1.128*
Community size large (greater than 500,000) .859*** .344 1.008*
Political affilliation (right) [ref.] - - -
Political affilliation (centre) .630** 2.292*** -1.588***
Political affilliation (left) .927*** 1.749*** -.704
Political affilliation (other/none) .609* 1.762 -1.434
Education (at or below lowest qualification) [ref.] - - -
Education (above lowest qualification) -.168 1.662* -5.168***
Education (high school diploma) .333 1.923*** -4.693***
Education (above secondary level) .036* 2.395*** -4.859***
Education (university degree) 1.138** 2.809*** -4.262***
Subjective national pride (very proud) [ref.] - - -
Subjective national pride (somewhat proud) 1.604*** 1.267*** -1.356***
4.010*** 2.921*** -4.462***
Family income (standardized score) .370*** .228** -
Gender (male) [ref.] - - -
Gender (female) -.677*** -.120 -
Age -.154*** -.023*** -
R2 .281
ANOVA 35.582***
Entries are standardised regression coefficients. *p<.05; **p<.01; ***p<.001
.237
19.677***
Attitudes towards  immigrantsNational identity
Subjective national pride (not very proud/not proud 
at all)
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The independent variables, the predictors in the model, are socio-economic, such
as community size, family income, education, work status,20 age and gender, and socio-
political, such as political affiliation and a subjective measure of national pride21 (see
appendix 3). The results of the linear regression analysis shows that the analysis accounts
for 28.1% of variation in attitudes about national identity, and 23.7% of variation in
attitudes towards immigrants and immigration. In other words, there is an indication that
the socio-demographic predictors often used to explain these dynamics, as they are
modelled here, do indeed have a strong effect on people’s attitudes. Further, the model
highlights how the two factors are affected differently by these predictors. This
underscores the findings in the principal components analysis, that two separate
underlying factors account for the variations in attitudes surrounding these dynamics.
A first observation that bears mention is that the results from the t-test in table 6
are reproduced within the context of this explanatory model. Even in the context of these
predictors, there is no significant difference between Canada and Denmark in attitudes
about national identity, whereas a significant difference exists in attitudes towards
immigration and immigrants. In the case of the latter, as was also concluded on the basis
of the crosstabulation of the variables within the factor (table 8), Canadians are more
open than Danes.
                                                 
20 This variable is excluded from the final table, since it was insignificant for both factors in all
iterations of the analysis.
21 For this variable, the respondents were asked to self-identify, on a scale ranging from ‘very
proud’ to ‘not proud at all,’ the degree of pride they feel about their country.
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5.2.1 ATTITUDES ABOUT NATIONAL IDENTITY
As mentioned, the variable capturing the respondents’ national identity is
significantly associated with all the predictors in the model: community size, political
affiliation, education, subjective national pride, income, gender, and age. Since no
difference exists between the two countries, no analysis was run that included the
interaction between the various predictors and country.
Generally, the predictors affect the dependent variable in ways that are not
entirely unexpected. People with higher levels of education are significantly more open
about their national identity than those at or below the lowest qualification. Similarly,
people with higher incomes exhibit more openness, as do younger people. People at both
the centre and left wing of the political spectrum are more open about their national
identity than people whose political affiliation is to the right of the centre. Interestingly,
men tend to be more open than women about national identity.
People who self-identify as having very little or no pride in their country are more
open about their national identity. While no conclusion can be made about the existence
of any causal relationship, this finding shows that attitudes about national pride and
national identity operate within similar dynamics.
Finally, the results regarding community size seems to support the discussion
about exposure to diversity discussed by a number of key informants (above, p. 59):
respondents in very large, urban communities are significantly more open about their
national identity than those from very small communities.
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5.2.2 ATTITUDES TOWARDS IMMIGRANTS
As mentioned above, the measure of attitudes towards immigrants differs
significantly between the two countries: Canadians are more open towards immigrants
than Danes. Furthermore, the model shows significant differences between the two
countries on all measures except age, income, and gender.
Only one effect of community size is significant in Denmark: people in
communities with 10,000-49,999 inhabitants are significantly less open in their attitudes
about immigrants than those in the reference category, respondents from communities
with less than 9,999 inhabitants.22 In Canada, on the other hand, people from the three
larger community sizes show significantly more openness than amongst communities of
less than 9,999 inhabitants. Respondents from the three larger community sizes do not
appear to differ much from one another, however, as indicated by figure 1, below.
Figure 1: degree of openness in attitudes towards immigrants by country and community size.
As in the question of openness about national identity, the debate about exposure
may shed light on these findings. Most Canadian immigrants settle in larger communities,
                                                 
22 Bear in mind the size of the 50,000-499,999 value may conceal relationships here. It is possible























which could possibly explain the significant difference when compared to the very small
communities. However, while the regression analysis does not address whether the
difference between the three larger communities is significant, the lack of a strong, linear
relationship between the community sizes in Canada indicates that there may be limits to
the benefit of exposure, an inference that seems to be supported by the Danish results.
Figure 2: degree of openness in attitudes towards immigrants by country and education.
The effect of education shows a relatively linear correlation in Denmark, so that
as a person’s educational level increases, the openness in attitudes towards immigrants
also increases. While the two countries differ significantly at all levels of education,
figure 2 emphasises how education plays a smaller role in Canada than in Denmark.
However, as the overall country effect is that Canadians are more open in their attitudes
towards immigrants, the difference in the effect of education does not result in less
openness in Canada than amongst Danish respondents.
The question of political affiliation reveals an interesting trend in both countries:
in Denmark, people at the centre or left wing of the political spectrum differ significantly


































close to each other. In Canada, as in the case of education described above, the overall
effect is of more openness even though the coefficients are negative.






















The finding that Canadian respondents at the centre of the political spectrum
differ from those on the right may reflect the emphasis on the two major political parties,
the Conservatives (at the right of the spectrum) and the Liberal Party (at the centre).
However, no significant difference exists between the right and left wings.
The final predictor that has a different effect on attitudes towards immigrants in
the two countries is that of subjective national pride. In the case of Denmark, the degree
of pride is inversely related to the openness they have towards immigrants. In Canada,
however, the opposite pattern occurs. The effect of subjective national pride in Canada
results in a pattern where the more proud Canadians are also the ones more likely to be
open towards immigrants.
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This intriguing finding may be attributable to the intertwining of national
consciousness and multiculturalism, so that being proud of being a Canadian also means
to stand for the official multicultural policy that has come to be identified with Canadian
identity.
5.3 CONCLUDING REMARKS
The quantitative analysis of the ISSP data on national identity has permitted an
exploration of variables pertaining to attitudes about immigrants and national identity at a
level that is representative of the Canadian and Danish populations. As such, the findings
are generalisable to the populations’ attitudes in the two countries.
The data analyses show that the variables indicative of attitudes about immigrants
and national identity are not configured around a single underlying concept, but rather of
two separate factors. One pertains to the degree to which the respondents are open to
differences in their perception of the national identity, while the other is an expression of
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attitudes about immigrants’ impact in society. Since the expectation is that the two
countries differ on matters related to both elements – national identity and immigrants –
the findings from the t-test are surprising: while the latter differs significantly between
the two countries, no significant difference exists in the openness of attitudes about
national identity.
The difference between the two factors is underscored by the linear regression,
where both are tested against the same explanatory model. Confirming the results of the
t-test, the significant predictors of the factor expressing attitudes about national identity
follow the same pattern in both countries, while the predictors of factor on attitudes
towards immigrants differs on all measures except age, gender, and income.
With two exceptions – the role of gender as a predictor of attitudes towards
immigrants, and the work status variable that proved to be insignificant within the context
of the other variables in the model – the variables included in the regression model are all
relevant. When combining them, a very sound model is created that is effective in
predicting a relatively large component of the behaviour of respondents within both
factors.
The final step of the project, which follows in the next chapter, is to consider the
results of the two analyses, qualitative and quantitative, within the context of one another,
the two countries’ histories, and the diversity hypothesis. This is a crucial step in the
analysis since, as described in chapter three, it is by considering the two analyses in
conjunction with one another that it becomes possible to understand and corroborate





The aim of this research project was to approach the question of intolerance
towards immigrants in a new way, by shifting the focus from linear causal models to an
analysis of the broad dynamics within which attitudes and discourses are negotiated. The
project’s intra-/extradiversity hypothesis shifts the focus from the economic/political
processes to the question of the receiving populations’ perceptions of their ‘self’ and
‘other.’ According to this hypothesis, perceptions of low intradiversity (such as the
situation in Denmark) coupled with perceptions of low extradiversity (again, as the
situation in Denmark, where the ‘other’ is largely perceived to be Muslims) leads to
negative attitudes about and restrictive responses to immigration. Conversely, perceptions
of high intradiversity coupled with perceptions of high extradiversity (as is the case in
Canada) will result in a higher degree of openness.
The review of the two countries’ recent immigration histories and current
discourses on immigration and diversity supports the hypothesis. In Canada, the
dominant discourse (‘a country of immigrants’) emphasises a large degree of
heterogeneity in perceptions of both intradiversity and extradiversity. The dominant
discourse on the ‘self’ in Denmark, on the other hand, underscores notions of
homogeneity, a theme that recurs in the discourses on the ‘other’ (largely identified as the
Muslims). However, this review also seems to suggest an amendment to the diversity
hypothesis: in its present form, the question of the character of the boundary between the
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‘self’ and the ‘other’ is not explicitly discussed and elaborated on in the hypothesis. This
boundary is sharp, clearly defined, and almost impenetrable in the Danish discourse – the
differences between the two groups operate at a very basic level, encompassing core
values and beliefs. On the other hand, the boundary appears blurred and almost invisible
in Canada. The central theme, “we are a country of immigrants,” discoursively erases the
difference between people born and raised in the country and newcomers.
In order to test the hypothesis, the project adopted a methods triangulation
approach. The triangulation was crucial for the analysis for a variety of reasons: the use
of multiple methods and data sources allows for a more nuanced analysis than the
reliance on a single methodology and analysis would, thereby compensating for
weaknesses in each methodological approach; it shifts the analysis away from the broadly
generalising, macro-level analyses relied on by most migration research; it creates a more
complete picture of the phenomenon being studied; and ideally it makes it possible to
corroborate findings and minimise erroneous conclusions.
The quantitative analysis, an exploratory analysis of a dataset encompassing
survey data from both countries, made it possible to compare Denmark and Canada on
findings from data that is generalisable to the two countries’ populations. However, since
the analysis uses secondary data, it was impossible to tailor the quantitative analysis to
ask the exact questions that would address the research question and hypothesis of this
project. The aim of the qualitative analysis, a series of key informant interviews, was to
fill in some of these gaps and address the question from a micro-level perspective. The
information from these interviews, while relying on the knowledge and opinions of
twenty people, was deep and extensive.
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For the quantitative analysis, the variables chosen for the principal components
analysis were selected on the basis of their perceived fit with the hypothesis; one series of
questions appeared to have to do with attitudes about immigrants, while the other seemed
to address the respondents’ national identity. As such, the expectation was that the
analysis would find significant differences between the two countries on the basis of
these variables throughout the analysis.
Surprisingly, this is not the case. The factor measuring the openness in national
identity does not differ between the two countries’ populations. As illustrated in table 7,
differences do exist on individual measures, and in the context of the two countries’
histories it is very telling (if not surprising) that Danes place more emphasis on ancestry
than Canadians, while Canadians stress the importance of citizenship to a larger extent
than Danes. However, the underlying factor, which explains 34.7% in the Canadian case
and 40.7% in the Danish, does not differ between the two countries. However, both
interview data and the review of the two countries’ discourses show that there are
enormous differences in the Danish and Canadian populations’ national identity, so that
the two countries appear to be almost perfect examples of the two types of nationalism,
civic and ethnic, discussed by Aronovitch (2000).
Two different explanations may possibly account for this finding. It is possible
that the responses are skewed due to social desirability bias. In this case, the respondents
answer the questions according to a perception of what would be the ‘proper’ answer to
the question. This explanation is supported by the distribution of responses to the six
questions in the factor. Only religion (and, in the Canadian case, ancestry) has a larger
proportion of respondents ranking it as minimally important or unimportant. As such, a
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series of questions asking about the conditions under which a person would be considered
a “true” national of the country may trigger sentiments about what ‘should’ lie at the
heart of the respondents’ definition of their national identity, regardless of whether they
would hold anyone they encounter in their daily lives to those standards.
Related to the issue of social desirability bias, the finding may reflect a very
different definition in the two countries of what constitutes a “true” national. The
questions ask about the importance of each of the six elements – birthplace, duration of
stay in the country, citizenship, religion, language, and ancestry – in a person’s identity as
a “true” Dane or Canadian, but they do not define what a “true Dane” and a “true
Canadian” are. That is left for the respondent to define.
The two countries’ dominant discourses about immigrants shed light on the ways
in which the countries’ populations define their national identity. The Canadian discourse
about being “a country of immigrants” blurs the line between newcomer and receiving
population and emphasises an individual-oriented view of society. Kymlicka’s (1995,
2003) argument about the success of multiculturalism policies in Canada – that Western
liberal democracies are able to accommodate minority groups as long as the rights of the
individuals are not threatened – recognises that same element, as do the findings of the
qualitative analysis in this project. Within the multiculturalism discourse, the Canadian
model of multiculturalism emphasises the individuals rather than the groups in society, an
element that is reiterated in the diversity discourse. The Danish respondents’ discussion
of the role of legislation in delineating the groups in Danish society also sheds light on
the possible mechanics surrounding the legislation in Canada. Since the Multiculturalism
Act addresses the Canadian people, it does not distinguish discoursively between those
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members of Canadian society that were born in the country and those who have only
recently arrived.
The two populations’ divergent responses to immigrants in the context of national
pride – the regression analysis shows that the less proud Danes are more open towards
immigrants, while the more proud Canadians are more open – further corroborates the
conclusion about a deep-seated connection between the Canadian national identity and
multiculturalism.
In the context of the difference between the outlook of Danes and Canadians with
regards to the national identity, the reason respondents in both countries agree on the
definition of diversity as it is expressed in the diversity discourse is to be found in the
subtle remarks by some Danish respondents. In the Danish discourse on diversity, as it is
reflected in these interviews, it is clear that the ideal of diversity is not yet achieved in
Denmark. The discussion about legislation underscores this point: by homogenising the
immigrant population and marking it as clearly different from the Danish majority, not
only does it emphasise the perception of low extradiversity, it also precludes diversity as
a positive development. In Denmark positive difference, much like the Canadian
multiculturalism model’s emphasis on respect and equality, has yet to be achieved.
Instead, the Danish understanding of “true” nationality stems from the discourse about
the longevity of cultural stability described by Knudsen (p. 28). This also explains why
ancestry is relatively more important among the Danish respondents than the Canadians.
The findings from the regression analysis regarding the impact of a person’s
community size on their attitudes towards immigrants may shed further light on the
dynamics in the two countries. In Denmark, only people from the second-smallest range
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of community sizes differ significantly from those in the smallest communities, who are
more open than those from communities in the 10,000-49,999 range. In Canada, on the
other hand, respondents from all three larger community sizes are significantly more
open towards immigrants. While the Canadian results appear to support the contact
theory advanced by Marschall and Stolle (2004) to some extent, the Danish numbers run
counter to the theory, which proposes that increased diversity within a person’s
community will lead to more openness towards diversity. Possibly, the conflict theory
around which Banting et al. (2005) and Putnam (2007) built their research better explains
the Danish scenario. However, given that no significant relationship exists, neither
positive nor negative, between the largest community sizes and attitudes towards
immigrants, it seems more likely that some other dynamic is at play.
The findings from the interviews support the diversity hypothesis very well. The
two models of multiculturalism are a very clear expression of the different ways in which
the two countries’ discourses reflect intradiversity and extradiversity. In the Canadian
model the ‘self’ and the ‘other’ are both highly diverse, while the Danish model, with the
negative image of immigrants as the troublesome Muslims and the emphasis on the value
conflict, clearly expresses very low levels of both intradiversity and extradiversity. As
such, one could argue that Denmark is, in this respect, closer to a model of biculturalism,
where ‘traditional’ Danes are on one side and immigrants on the other side of the social
and political spectrum.
The discovery that the various variables pertaining to attitudes about immigrants
reflect a single underlying discourse, one that is significantly different between Denmark
and Canada, lends further support to the hypothesis. Not only do Danes perceive of very
105
low extradiversity, this perception is also reflected in a lower degree of openness towards
immigrants. Conversely, the Canadian perception of high extradiversity is reflected in a
comparatively higher degree of openness towards immigrants in the country.
This circumstance is clearly replicated in the integration discourses in the two
countries. Whereas the Canadian approach to integration is, as Barbara describes it, a
two-way approach where newcomers and receiving population make adjustment to live
together, the Danish approach places the burden with the immigrants. This circumstance
is problematised by the Danish legislation, which marginalises the immigrant population,
as Caroline and Martin explain (p. 75).
Even as the diversity hypothesis posited in this project endeavours to simplify the
analysis of the dynamics surrounding the negotiation of discourses and attitudes about
national identity and immigration, the decision to abandon a macro-level, causal analysis
herein has highlighted the extreme complexity of the situation. Legislation, public
opinion, and political discourses, to list but a few of the many factors touched upon in the
analyses, interact to form a complex grid within which perceptions of intradiversity and
extradiversity are formed. The diversity hypothesis does have some shortcomings, failing
to explicitly address, first of all, the question of individual-level versus group-level
understandings of one’s social world and, secondly, the nature of the distinction between
the ‘self’ and the ‘other.’ However, the hypothesis is an analytical tool that makes it
possible to better understand the reasons behind each population’s responses to
immigration and newcomers, while the specific countries selected for this project’s
analyses helped shed light on the dynamics within which the hypothesis operate. As such,
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This project began with an assertion that more research is needed to explore the
connections between identity and intolerance within the context of immigration. Not only
is this becoming ever more urgent as international migration intensifies already existing
conflicts surrounding the receiving populations’ responses to the newcomers, but the field
of immigration research is wanting for more empirical research on the connections
between immigration and xenophobia.
In an attempt to abandon the macro-level, causal models predominant in
immigration research, the research question asked, what are the dynamics within which
discourses and attitudes about immigration are shaped? The dynamics this question
attempts to address are captured in a hypothesis that models national identity around
heterogeneity and homogeneity: the concepts of intradiversity and extradiversity capture
the receiving population’s perceptions of the ‘self’ and the ‘other’ in terms that describe
the degree of perceived diversity within each category. The way in which these two
expressions of diversity are perceived is instrumental in shaping responses to
immigration.
In order to shed light on this hypothesis, the project adopted two methodological
approaches that are often overlooked by researchers: the international comparative
approach made it possible to search for answers in two locations that exemplify very
different expressions of the dynamics in question. Further, the methods triangulation
approach made it possible to explore the phenomenon from multiple angles, thereby
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achieving a deep and nuanced understanding of the dynamics. More importantly, drawing
on both qualitative and quantitative data made it possible to overcome weaknesses in
each approach, minimise the sources of error, and corroborate the findings.
These methodological decisions proved to be immensely valuable in each step of
the research project. The comparative perspective made it possible to compare two
locations whose patterns of intradiversity and extradiversity differ vastly. The two
countries’ immigration histories and their current discourses surrounding immigration
place them near opposite ends on the spectrum of immigration responses in the Western
world. It is this difference that made it possible to uncover some of the dynamics
surrounding national identity and diversity that came to light in the research process.
The two analyses, one qualitative and one quantitative, shed light on the ways in
which the two countries’ populations structure their understanding of the national identity
vis a vis immigrants. The findings support the diversity hypothesis: the population of
Canada, a country whose dominant discourse on the matter touts it as a country of
immigrants, exhibits perceptions of very high levels of intradiversity and, to some extent,
high levels of extradiversity. The discourses surrounding immigration are generally open,
emphasising the incorporation of the immigrants into Canadian society and debating on
the best way to encourage the newcomers to become productive, happy members of
society. Denmark, on the other hand, is an example of a population with perceptions of
low levels of both intra- and extradiversity. The dominant discourse emphasises the
stability and longevity of the Danish culture and juxtaposes it with that of immigrants or,
more precisely, Muslims. Both groups are represented as highly homogeneous.
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The qualitative analysis revealed two models of multiculturalism – the Danish and
the Canadian model – that underscore the dynamics described in the hypothesis and allow
us to expand on it. A significant point on which the two models differ has to do with the
level of society at which multiculturalism operates; the basis of the Danish model is
groups, while the Canadian model emphasises individuals. This difference implies that
the emphasis on the distinction between the ‘self’ and the ‘other’ is significant. Where the
Canadian model obscures the distinction to quite a large extent, the Danish model
accentuates it. Quite possibly, this is a significant piece of the puzzle regarding these
dynamics. These two elements may well serve as starting points for future research on the
questions addressed here.
With the purpose of abandoning the macro-level, causal models that are so
prevalent in immigration studies, this project adopted two key approaches to explore
alternative ways of understanding responses to immigration in the Western world. The
triangulation approach opened up the possibility of including micro-level data and the use
of multiple data sources allowed for the minimisation of erroneous conclusions by
corroborating findings and offering alternative explanations to questions that arose during
the research process. Conducting the research in an international comparative
perspective, a decision that was born out of initial, anecdotal observations of the two
countries’ responses to immigration, helped define the diversity hypothesis and added an
essential element as the two countries’ different approaches helped shed light on
dynamics in both places. Future research on the subject will benefit immensely from
implementing these same two approaches. However, aside from the limitations of the
data discussed in chapter three, one major limitation could have been accommodated for
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in the design of this research project: Canada is a vast country, and discourses vary not
only between different types of communities but also between provinces. The Canadian
respondents’ omission of the role of Quebec in their discussion of the Canadian
discourses on national identity and immigration is a glaring one, and a different
combination of respondents would possibly have highlighted different aspects of the
dynamics. This does not disqualify the findings of the present research, but it does
underscore the need to better understand the ways the discourses both differ and overlap
between Canadian provinces. Furthermore, in light of the recent debates about reasonable
accommodation in Quebec, an analysis comparing dynamics surrounding national
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INTERVIEW GUIDE, On Intolerance and Immigration: Understanding Perceptions of
Intra- and Extra-Diversity in Denmark and Ontario
Themes: Legislation, public discourse (media), general attitude in population; how each
pertains to diversity
1) How does your position (at work) have to do with immigration and integration?
Probe: Background, competences; concrete work tasks; experience, expertise
2) Do you find that the legislation surrounding immigration in [country] is
particularly open/closed towards immigrants?
Probes: Why/why not
3) What about the public debate, do you find it to be generally positive or negative
towards immigrants?
Probes: Why/why not
4) How would you describe the general situation of immigration in [country]?
Probes: Attitudes towards immigrants
Attitudes about immigration in general
Popular attitudes in population
Has the situation changed / is it better or worse than before?
5) How would you define diversity/multiculturalism/difference (within the context
of the topic of immigration)?
6) Do you think diversity is an important concept in [country]?
Probes: Why/why not
In what sense
Diversity of immigrant population -> what does one group contribute
compared to another? (Ex. Asians vs. South Americans)
Diversity of receiving population
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CONSENT TO PARTICIPATE IN IMMIGRATION, DIVERSITY AND TOLERANCE
This is to state the I agree to participate in a program of research being conducted by
Malene Bodington of the Department of Sociology and Anthropology of Concordia
University (514-880-4053, malene@bodington.ca).
A. PURPOSE
I have been informed that the purpose of the research is as follows: to investigate the
possible links between immigration patterns, perceptions of diversity of the immigrant
and receiving populations, and intolerance levels in an international comparative
perspective. All information gathered will be used in the writing of an M.A. Thesis.
B. PROCEDURES
For this research project, I will be asked to complete a short questionnaire pertaining to
the issues of the research project. An interview will follow, in which I will be asked
follow-up questions to the questionnaire and, in light of my expertise on the matter, to
evaluate the issues addressed by the research project. The entire interview process is
expected to last approximately one hour.
C: CONDITIONS OF PARTICIPATION
• I understand that I am free to withdraw my consent and discontinue
my participation at anytime without negative consequences.
• I would like my participation in this study to be:
* NON-CONFIDENTIAL (i.e., my identity will be revealed in study
results) _______ (initials)
* CONFIDENTIAL (i.e., the researcher will know, but will not
disclose my identity) _______ (initials)
• I understand that the data from this study may be published.
I HAVE CAREFULLY STUDIED THE ABOVE AND UNDERSTAND THIS
AGREEMENT. I FREELY CONSENT AND VOLUNTARILY AGREE TO
PARTICIPATE IN THIS STUDY.
NAME (please print) ________________________________________________
SIGNATURE ______________________________________________________
If at any time you have questions about your rights as a research participant, please
contact Adela Reid, Research Ethics and Compliance Officer, Concordia University, at
514-848-2424 x 7481 or by email at Adela.Reid@concordia.ca.
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Accept af deltagelse i INDVANDRING, MANGFOLDIGHED OG TOLERANCE
Undertegnede accepterer at deltage i et forskningsprojekt udført af Malene Bodington fra
Concordia Universitetets Afdeling for Sociologi og Antropologi (+1-514-880-5043,
mbodington@gmail.com).
A. FORMÅL
Jeg er blevet informeret om at formålet med forskningsprojektet er: at undersøge
sammenhængen mellem indvandring, den modtagende befolknings opfattelse af
mangfoldighed blandt indvandrerbefolkningen samt niveauer af intolerance i et
internationalt, komparativt perspektiv. Al information vil blive brugt til at skrive en
kandidatafhandling.
B. PROCEDURER
Som led i projektet vil jeg blive bedt om at udfylde et kort spørgeskema som omhandler
de problemstillinger forskningsprojektet behandler. Efterfølgende vil jeg deltage i et
interview, hvor jeg vil blive spurgt om samme temaer og bedt om, i lyset af min
ekspertise på området, at evaluere problemstillingerne i forskningsprojektet.
Interviewprocessen vil vare ca. en time.
C: FORHOLD FOR DELTAGELSE
• Jeg forstår at jeg har ret til at trække min accept af deltagelse tilbage og nægte
deltagelse i projektet når som helst i processen uden negative konsekvenser.
• Jeg forstår at min deltagelse i dette forskningsprojekt er IKKE-KONFIDENTIEL
(dvs. at min identitet vil blive videreformidlet i resultatsrapporter).
• Jeg forstår at resultater fra forskningsprojektet evt. vil blive offentligtgjorte.
JEG HAR LÆST OG FORSTÅET DE OVENSTÅENDE FORHOLD OG
ACCEPTERER AF EGEN VILJE AT DELTAGE I DETTE FORSKNINGSPROJEKT.
NAVN (blokbogstaver) _____________________________________________
UNDERSKRIFT ___________________________________________________
Hvis du har spørgsmål om dine rettigheder som deltager i et forskningsprojekt beder vi
dig kontakte Adela Reid, Research Ethics and Compliance Officer, Concordia
Universitet, på +1-514-848-2424 x 7481 eller email Adela.Reid@concordia.ca.
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Immigration, Diversity, and Tolerance
The research project Immigration, Diversity, and Tolerance is an international,
comparative study that examines reactions to immigration at various levels of society.
The project compares responses to immigration in Denmark and Canada through three
main perspectives: legislation, public opinion, and media debate.
The purpose of the project is to obtain a better understanding of the ways in which
attitudes towards immigration, immigrants, and integration are shaped within the
receiving populations, and how these attitudes are affected by and affect media debates
and legislation surrounding the issue.
The project is carried out by Malene Bodington, a sociology M.A. student from the
Department of Sociology and Anthropology at Concordia University in Montreal, from
April-September 2007. It entails the collection of interview data, media data, legislation,
statistics, and surveys. The project will result in an M.A. thesis, authored by Malene
Bodington, and all results may in part or entirety be published at a later date.
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Indvandring, mangfoldighed og tolerance
Forskningsprojektet Indvandring, mangfoldighed og tolerance er et internationalt,
komparativt studie der undersøger hvorledes folk reagerer overfor indvandring. Projektet
sammenligner reaktioner i Danmark og Canada gennem tre perspektiver: lovgivning,
offentlig mening og mediedebat.
Formålet med projektet er, at opnå bedre forståelse for hvordan holdninger til
indvandring, indvandrere og integration dannes i befolkningen, og hvordan disse
holdninger påvirkes af og påvirker mediedebatter og lovgivning om emnet.
Projektet gennemføres af Malene Bodington, en kandidatstuderende ved Afdeling
for Sociologi og Antropologi på Concordia Universitetet i Montreal, Canada, fra april-
september 2007. Det omfatter indsamling af interviewdata, mediedata, lovgivning,
statistik og meningsmålinger. Projektet vil resultere i en kandidatafhandling af Malene
Bodington.
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1) If you must rank the importance of
immigration to Canada, is it ...
a) Very important
b) Somewhat important
c) Not very important
d) Unimportant
2) Looking at the following items, how
would you rank them in terms of their
importance in the motivation of
Canadian immigration/ border policy?
(Please rank from 1 to 5)
[  ] Strengthening Canadian economy
[  ] Revitalising Canadian culture
[  ] Political responsibility vis à vis the
sending countries
[  ] Demographic growth
[  ] Other, please specify:
________________________________
________________________________
3) Do you think the number of
immigrants admitted to the country
should...
a) ... decrease a lot
b) ... decrease somewhat
c) ... remain the same
d) ... increase somewhat
e) ... increase a lot
4) How many immigrants do you think
are admitted to Canada each year?
________________________________
________________________________
5) How many people, in percent of the
total population, would you estimate are
born outside of Canada?
______________________________
______________________________
6) What ratio, in percent, of those do you think
are from ...
_______ Africa?
_______ The Middle East?
_______ Central and Southeast Asia?
_______ Western Europe and North America?
7) How important do you think it is to share or
adopt Canadian values and norms to become well
integrated into Canadian society?
a) Very important
b) Somewhat important
c) Not very important
d) Unimportant
8) Of the following factors, which do you think
are most important to the successful integration
of an immigrant into Canadian society? (Please
rank from 1 to 5)
[  ] Language skills/acquisition
[  ] Previous work experience
[  ] Education
[  ] Social network in Canada
[  ] Family ties within Canada





10) How large a proportion of the immigrant




11) In your opinion, what is the highest
number of immigrants Canada can receive each




12) How open or closed would you say












13) Hvis du skal vurdere vigtigheden af
indvandring til Danmark, er det...
a) Meget vigtigt
b) Vigtigt
c) Ikke særligt vigtigt
d) Slet ikke vigtigt
14) Hvordan vil du rangordne de
følgende punkter i forhold til hvor
vigtige de er for Danmarks
indvandrerpolitik? (numerér fra 1 til 5)
[  ] Betydning for Danmarks økonomi
[  ] Fornyelse af Danmarks kultur
[  ] Politisk ansvar overfor afsenderlandene
[  ] Demografisk vækst
[  ] Andet:
________________________________
________________________________
15) Mener du at antallet af indvandrere
til landet bør...
a) ... Nedsættes meget
b) ... Nedsættes en smule
c) ... Forblive det samme
d) ... Øges en smule
e) ... Øges meget
16) Hvor mange indvandrere mener du
kommer til Danmark hvert år?
________________________________
________________________________
17) Hvor mange mennesker, i procent af








_______ Central- og Sydøstasien?
_______ Vesteuropa og Nordamerika?
19) Hvor vigtigt mener du det er at dele
eller påtage sig Danmarks værdier og




c) Ikke særligt vigtigt
d) Slet ikke vigtigt
20) Hvilke af de følgende faktorer
mener du er mest vigtige for succesfuld
integration af indvandrere i det danske
samfund? (numerér fra 1 til 5)
[  ] Sprog (evner og/eller læring)
[  ] Arbejdserfaring fra det andet land
[  ] Uddannelse
[  ] Socialt netværk i Danmark
[  ] Familiebånd i Danmark






22) Hvor stor en del af indvandrer-
befolkningen i Danmark tror du er i
stand til at blive velintegrerede?
________________________________
________________________________
23) Hvad er efter din mening det højeste
antal indvandrere Danmark bør
acceptere hvert år uden at integrationen
af indvandrere påvirkes negativt?
________________________________
________________________________
24) Hvor åben eller lukket mener du









Victor – Member of Parliament for political party within the government coalition.
Works with issues of immigration politically and professionally, but does not hold any
official position related to immigration.
Robert – Journalist at large, national newspaper. Has been in charge of immigration
material in the past.
Caroline – Social researcher who works on issues of youth and ethnicity.
Martin – Consultant on integration to municipalities in Denmark. Immigration
background.
 Tony – Municipal politician in large urban municipality, centre-left wing party.
Immigration background.
Maria – Journalist at large, national newspaper. Works under the rubric ‘immigration
and justice.’
Peter – Private agency consultant on questions of integration and diversity. Consults with
public organisations and private corporations. Immigration background.
Michael – Member of Parliament for opposition party. Works with issues of immigration
within the political context, but does not hold an official position related to immigration.




Walter – Member of Parliament for opposition party. Holds position related to
immigration and integration. Telephone interview.
Judy – Public servant with agency in the immigration field.
Heather – Public servant in large urban centre, consults with boroughs on issues
regarding diversity.
Kathleen – Public servant in large municipality with high immigrant settlement rate.
Lisa – Diversity coordinator with large, urban municipality. Immigration background.
William – Journalist at large newspaper, covers immigration material. Immigration
background.
Kevin – Member of Parliament for opposition party. Holds position related to
immigration and integration. Immigration background. Telephone interview.
Barbara – Public servant in large urban centre. Consults with politicians on management
of diverse populations. Immigration background.
Christopher – Social researcher who carries out cross-cultural research on immigration
and refugees. Immigration background. Telephone interview.




TABLE 10: DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS, PREDICTORS FOR LINEAR REGRESSION
N % N % p.
Community size
<9999 193 16.6 486 40.1
10.000-49.999 298 25.6 297 24.5
50.000-499.999 407 34.9 201 16.6
>500.000 267 22.9 227 18.7 .000
Political affiliation
Right 204 17.7 564 49.6
Centre 446 38.8 114 10.0
Left 172 15.0 448 39.4
Other/none 328 28.5 12 1.1 .000
Education
At/below lowest qualification 84 7.1 70 5.6
above lowest qualification 136 11.4 88 7.0
High school diploma 299 25.1 489 38.9
Above secondary level 357 30.0 437 34.8
University degree 315 26.4 172 13.7 .000
Work status
Unemployed 37 3.1 60 4.6
Not working 474 40.1 436 33.8
Part time 126 10.7 100 7.7
Full time 544 46.1 695 53.8 .000
Subjective national pride
Very proud 815 69.8 430 33.9
Somewhat proud 316 27.1 700 55.2
Not very proud 25 2.1 118 9.3
Not proud at all 12 1.0 20 1.6 .000
Subjective national pride
Very proud 815 69.8 430 33.9
Somewhat proud 316 27.1 700 55.2
Not very proud/Not proud at all 37 3.2 138 10.9 .000
Gender
Male 654 54.6 646 48.9











Mean S.D. Min Max t-test (df) p.
Family income Denmark a 240387.6 144395.7 50000 650000
Canada b 37537.59 23405.37 7500 80000
Age 47.36 18 92
Canada 53.87 14.931 18 94
a Currency: Danish Kroner
b Currency: Canadian Dollars
.700
.00024019.976
16.703Denmark
-0.386 2244
